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Introduction
On September 21, 1993, when President Boris Yeltsin issued the Decree
* Professor of Law, University of Vienna, Austria; Visiting Prdfessor of Law,
Cornell Law School. This article was submitted on February 23, 1995.
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on Step-by-Step Constitutional Reform in the Russian Federation 1 dis-
missing the Russian Parliament and calling for new elections, the Supreme
Soviet, under the leadership of Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov, immediately
countered with a resolution which declared the powers of the President
terminated under Article 121.6 of the Constitution.2 At the Parliament's
request, Constitutional Court Chairman Valerii Zorkin called an emer-
gency session of the Court, although the President's decree had
"instructed" the Court not to convene any sessions.3 On the night of Sep-
tember 21, the Constitutional Court decided by a majority of nine to four 4
that the President's violations of the Constitution provided grounds for his
removal from office under either Constitution Article 121.10 (impeach-
ment proceedings) or 121.6 (automatic termination).5
As the power struggle continued, the parliamentary leadership, under
Speaker Khasbulatov, and Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoi, who had
joined them in their confrontation with President Yeltsin, found them-
selves on September 28 isolated in the "White House" (the Russian parlia-
ment building) by police and army forces loyal to President Yeltsin and his
government. On October 3, anti-Yeltsin demonstrators, encouraged by
Vice-President Rutskoi, attacked the Moscow mayor's office and the
Ostankino television station. In the course of this raid, sixty-two people
were killed.6 On October 4, Yeltsin's troops stormed the White House and
1. Ukaz [hereinafter Presidential Decree] No. 1400, RossusiuE VEiST, Sept. 22,
1994, at 1, translated in 45 CURRENT DIG. OF THE PosT-SovIEr PRESS No. 38, at 1 (1993).
2. Postanovlenie [hereinafter Congress Res.] No. 5780-I, RoSSusKAA GAZETA, Sept.
23, 1993, at 2, translated in 45 CuRRTrr DIG. OF THE PosT-Sovier PRESS No. 38, at 6
(1993). Article 121.6 read: "The powers of the President may not be used to change the
national-state structure of the Russian Federation or to dissolve or suspend any legiti-
mately elected body of state power. If this is done, these powers are terminated immediately."
The italicized sentence was inserted by constitutional amendment on December 9,
1992. Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 2, Item No. 55 (1992), translated in CONsTrruTiONs OF
THE CouTrrIas OF THE WORLD, RusstIA FEDERATION, Release 93-3 (Albert P. Blaustein &
Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1993) [hereinafter Old Const.]. As the result of an agreement
with the President, Congress passed a resolution suspending the article until a referen-
dum could be held. Congress Res. No. 4079-I, Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 51, Item No.
3016 (1992), translated in 44 CURRENT DIG. OF THE Posr-SoviEr PRESS No. 10, at 10-11
(1993). The referendum was scheduled for April 11, 1993. Id. The article was subse-
quently "unfrozen" by a resolution declaring the December agreement invalid when the
conflict between the President and Parliament escalated. Congress Res. No. 4626-I,
Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 12, Item No. 439 (1993), translated in 45 CURRENT Dic. OF THE
PosT-Sovitr PRESS No. 10, at 10-11 (1993).
3. Presidential Decree No. 1400, supra note 1, item 10.
4. The pro-Yeltsin minority consisted of Deputy Chairman Nikolai Vitruk and Jus-
tices ErnestAmetistov, Anatolii Kononov, and Tamara Morshchakova. SeePyotr Zhurav-
lyov & Dmitry Volkov, Parliament. The 'Coup'--A Chronology of Events, SEGODNIA, Sept. 23,
1993, at 1, translated in 45 CURRENT DIG. OF THE PosT-SoVr PRESS No. 38, at 5 (1993).
5. For the text of the Court's finding, see RossnsKAIA GAZETA, Sept. 23, 1993, at 2,
translated in 45 CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS No. 38, at 6 (1993).
6. On the-chronology of these events, see, e.g., ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 1993, at 55;
Yeltsin Foes Force Showdown, Are Crushed, 45 CURRENT DIG. OF THE Posr-SoVIET PRESS No.
40, at 1-14 (1993). For a more complete appraisal, see Dwight Semler, The End of the
First Russian Republic, E. EUR. CONsT. REv., Winter 1994, at 107.
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arrested Khasbulatov and Rutskoi. 7
On October 6, Constitutional Court Chairman Zorkin, under pres-
sure from the President's office,8 resigned his chairmanship but remained
a Court member. On October 7, President Yeltsin signed the Decree on
the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation,9 accusing the Court of
flagrant violations of its duties and suspending its decisionmaking process
until the adoption of the new Constitution. 10 However, the President
charged the Court, under the leadership of Acting Chairman Nikolai
Vitruk, with preparing proposals for submission to the future federal
assembly concerning "forms of implementing constitutional justice in the
Russian Federation, including the possibility of creating a constitutional
collegium within the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.""
The Court, which can hardly be blamed for undergoing a re-evalua-
tion of political reality and an adjustment that might ensure personal
security as well as institutional survival, demurely accepted President Yelt-
sin's carrot-and-stick approach. In preparing the Draft Constitution,
which was published on November 10, 1993,12 and adopted by popular
referendum on December 12, 1993,13 President Yeltsin chose not to abol-
ish the Constitutional Court.14 On the basis of Article 125 of this new
Constitution,15 the Russian Parliament promulgated the Federal Constitu-
tional Law on the Constitutional Court' 6 and by February 7, 1995, six addi-
tional justices had been appointed.' 7 Now that the last vacancy has been
7. ECONoMIsr, supra note 6, at 55.
8. See Vladimir Orlov, Valery Zorkin, Moscow News, Oct. 13, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News Library, MOSNWS File.
9. Presidential Decree No. 1612, Rossiis, A GAzETA, Oct. 9, 1993, at 1, translated
in 45 CURRENT DIG. OF THE PosT-SovIEr PRESS No. 41, at 13 (1993) [hereinafter Yeltsin
Decree].
10. Id. item 1.
11. Id. item 5.
12. ROssIIsKA GAZETA, Nov. 10, 1993, at 3-6, translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, Release 93-8 (Albert P. Blaustein &
Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1993) [hereinafter New Const.].
13. See Election Returns Updated (but Still Not Final), 45 CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-
SoviE PREsS No. 51, at 7 (1993).
14. Article 125 of the Draft Constitution ofJuly 12, 1993, approved by the Constitu-
tional Assembly, contained less elaborate provisions for a Constitutional Court. Presi-
dent Yeltsin's earlier April 29, 1993 Draft had reduced the jurisdiction of the
Constitutional Court (Article 121) and transferred some of its powers (e.g., interpreta-
tion of the Constitution, impeachment findings, review of the constitutionality ofjudi-
cial practice) to a new organ, the SupremeJudicial Conference of the Federation. See
Constitution of the Russian Federation, KONsTrrTrsIONNOE SOVESHCHANIE, Aug. 1993, at
109, 138, translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, RUSSIAN FEDER-
ATION, Release 93-6 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1993) [hereinafterJuly
Draft].
15. See infra text accompanying note 114.
16. See infra text accompanying note 127.
17. See infra note 231. Article 125 of the Draft Constitution adopted by the Consti-
tutional Assembly on July 12, 1993, provided for 18 judges; President Yeltsin's revision
published on November 10 increased this number to 19. July Draft, supra note 14, art.
125.
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filled and the Court has thus become operational,' 8 one hopes that at
least some lessons of the past have been learned and that the new Court
will be able to make a more substantial and enduring contribution to legal
culture and the rule of law than its predecessor.
Part I of this article, in a necessarily selective fashion, appraises the
brief and ultimately unsuccessful tenure of the Zorkin Court. Part II
examines the reform legislation concerning constitutional adjudication
introduced by President Yeltsin in the new Russian Constitution of Decem-
ber 1993. Part III discusses the Constitutional Law on the Constitutional
Court of July 1994. After describing in Part IV the arduous appointment
process of newjustices up to February 1995, the article, in Part V, evaluates
the new structure, functions, and future prospects of the "new" Russian
Constitutional Court.
I. The Zorkin Court (1991-1993): An Obituary19
In June 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev persuaded the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) that perestroika, to be successful, required the devel-
opment of a "Socialist state committed to the rule of law."20 Among the
various measures taken to attain this goal, a Committee of Constitutional
Supervision of the USSR was established to review and ensure the obser-
vance of constitutionality and legality in the Soviet political system.2 ' The
member republics of the USSR were authorized to create their own institu-
tions of constitutional review.22 Rather than following the federal exam-
ple of setting up a committee with predominantly advisory and suspensive
functions that would recognize the supremacy of parliament, the Russian
Republic, after its declaration of sovereignty on June 12, 1991, chose to
establish a genuine Constitutional Court.2 3 The Russian Law on the Con-
18. See infra text accompanying note 234.
19. When I visited the Russian Constitutional Court in April 1993, a Russian
colleague introducing me to some of the justices jokingly remarked, "Professor
Hausmaninger wrote an article on your predecessor institution, the Soviet Committee
of Constitutional Supervision. When the article had been published, the Committee
was dissolved. He is now writing about the Russian Constitutional Court!" Thejustices
were not amused.
20. See Resolution of the 19th Party Conference of the CPSU, Moscow NEws, July 5, 1988,
Supplement, at 6.
21. Herbert Hausmaninger, The Committee of Constitutional Supervision of the USSR, 23
CORNEtLL INT'L LJ. 287 (1990) [hereinafter Hausmaninger I]. See also Herbert Haus-
maninger, From the Soviet Committee of Constitutional Supervision to the Russian Constitu-
tional Court, 25 CoRNEu. INT'L .J 305, 332 (1992) [hereinafter Hausmaninger II]. For
a more recent evaluation, see Alexander Blankenagel, Toward Constitutionalism in Rus-
sia, E. EUR. CONST. REv., Summer 1992, at 25. For a more elaborate study by the same
author, see Alexander Blankenagel, Verfassungskontrolle in der UdSSR: Das kure Leben
und der schnelle Tod des Komitees fir Vefassungsaufsicht; 32 DER STAAT 448 (1993).
22. Law of the USSR on Constitutional Supervision in the USSR, art. 2, Vedomosti
SSSR, Issue No. 29, Item No. 572 (1989), translated in 42 CuzrR DIG. OF THE SOVIET
PREss No. 9, at 13 (1990).
23. A constitutional amendment (Article 119), enacted on October 27, 1989, pro-
vided for a Committee of Constitutional Supervision of the RSFSR. Vedomosti RSFSR,
Issue No. 44, Item No. 1303 (1989). However, a subsequent amendment on December
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stitutional Court was adopted in July 1991, and Parliament elected the first
thirteen Court members in October 1991.24 The constitutional number
ofjustices on the Court was fifteen, but the Parliament could not agree on
whom to elect to fill the two remaining vacancies. HoWever, the law per-
mitted the Court to be operative in the presence of ten members.25 The
justices elected Professor Valerii D. Zorkin as Chairman and Professor
Nikolai V. Vitruk as Vice-Chairman of the Court.26
A. Jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court
Article 165 of the Russian Constitution, as amended on April 21, 1992,27
defined the Constitutional Court as "the highest organ ofjudicial power in
the protection of the constitutional order."28 Under Article 165.1, the
Court's jurisdiction encompassedjudicial as well as non-judicial functions.
Among the former, the two major areas were undoubtedly the adjudica-
tion of the constitutionality of legal norms29 at the request of various state
organs ° and the adjudication of complaints of individual citizens against
violations of their constitutional rights.3 '
1. Citizens' Complaints
Like the German constitutional complaint,3 2 after which the Russian
instrument was modelled, the adjudication of citizens' complaints was an
extraordinary remedy to secure the protection of civil rights. The Russian
complaint-as opposed to the German-could not be directed against a
statute, but only against the application of the law by courts or administra-
tive organs when all other remedies had been exhausted.3 3 It was avail-
able to persons claiming that their fundamental rights or other
constitutionally protected interests had been violated by an established
pattern of administrative action or constant adjudicative practice (in par-
15, 1990, reformulated Article 119 to provide for a Constitutional Court. Vedomosti
RSFSR, Issue No. 29, Item No. 395 (1990). See Law on the Constitutional Court of the
RSFSR, Vedomosti PSFSR, Issue No. 30, Item No. 1017 (1991), translated in FBIS-USR-
91-029, Sept. 10, 1991 [hereinafter Old Law]; see also Hausmaninger II, supra note 21, at
332.
24. Vedomosti RSFSR, Issue No. 44, Item No. 1450 (1991). In 1993, biographies of
the justices were published in an unnumbered issue of VESmiK KONSTrrtSIONNOGO
SUDA RossusKoi FEDERATSII [hereinafter VESTNiK]. Subsequent issues of the journal, in
which the decisions of the Court were to be published, have not appeared.
25. Old Law, supra note 23, art. 3, J[ 4. "The RSFSR Constitutional Court has the
right to commence its activities under the condition that at least two-thirds of its mem-
bership has been elected." Id.
26. Hausmaninger II, supra note 21, at 333.
27. Vedomosti RSFSR, Issue No. 20, Item No. 1084 (1992).
28. Id.
29. Old Law, supra note 23, art. 57.
30. Id. art. 59.
31. Id. art. 66.
32. GRUNDGESMEZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 93(1), items 4a and 4b. Gesetz fiber das
Bundesverfassungsgericht, BGBI IS. 2229, arts. 12(8a) and 90 [hereinafter German
Law].
33. Old aw, supra note 23, art. 66, 1.
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ticular such practice as based on "guiding explanations" of the highest
courts). As the law empowered the Constitutional Court to examine legal
acts even if they were only capable of creating an unconstitutional prac-
tice,M and also gave it the right to reject a complaint if it considered such
examination "inadvisable" (netselesoobraznym),35 the Court enjoyed great
latitude in accepting or rejecting individual complaints.
In the course of 1992, the Court received no fewer than 1700 citizens'
complaints, most of them without merit but a good number seeming to
have deserved more attention than the Court was able or willing to devote.
Individual complaints were examined by the Registry of the Court, occa-
sionally returned for improvement, but most frequently rejected at this
point. Justices did not participate in these decisions. Constitutional ques-
tions recognized as such by the Registry staff were submitted to the Chair-
man, the Vice-Chairman, or the Secretary of the Court, who sent them to
one of several specialized divisions36 of the Secretariat. On the basis of a
report prepared by the staff of legal specialists, the Court would then vote
whether to accept the case, and if accepted, the Chairman would assign it
to ajustice as reporter, who was responsible for preparing the case for oral
hearing 3 7
2. Court Practice in Civil Rights Cases
Of the six individual complaints heard and decided by the Court in the
first sixteen months of its activity (between January 1992 and April 1993),
four concerned labor relations,38 one a dispute about living quarters,3 9
and one a deputy's loss of his parliamentary seat upon his appointment as
a minister.40 In the months leading up to the suspension of the Court on
October 6, 1993, the justices did little to improve the skimpy record in this
area. Instead, they handed down only one opinion based on an individual
complaint.4 1 Only a minority of the justices were critical of the fact that
the Court did not devote sufficient attention to human rights questions.
They consistently proposed that the Court curb its political activism and
instead give priority to civil rights matters.4 2 But the Court majority, led
34. Id. 3.
35. Id. art. 69, 14.
36. E.g., labor law, civil law, or criminal law.
37. Interviews with Justice Boris Ebseev and Senior Consultant Professor Boris
Strashun (April 1993).
38. Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 13, Item No. 669 (1992); Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 30,
Item No. 1809 (1992); Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 14, Item No. 508 (1993); Vedomosti RF,
Issue No. 29, Item No. 1141 (1993). On Sept. 24, 1992, the Court issued an interpreta-
tion of the first of these opinions. Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 41, Item No. 2258 (1992).
39. Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 12, Item No. 445 (1993).
40. The loss was considered to be in conformity with the Constitution. Vedomosti
RF, Issue No. 19, Item No. 702 (1993).
41. The Izvestiia case, decided on May 19, 1993, struck down part of a Supreme
Soviet resolution as unconstitutional. RFE/RL NEws BiuFrs, May 14-21, 1993, at 5. For
commentary on the other eight opinions rendered between May and September 1993,
see infra note 52.
42. Interview with Justice Tamara Morshchakova (April 1993).
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by Chairman Zorkin, rejected this criticism and insisted that the role of
the Court in the ongoing constitutional crisis, produced by the confronta-
tion between the President and the Parliament, should be to focus its
attention on arrogation ofjurisdiction and unconstitutional enactments by
state organs.48
B. Review of Constitutionality of Legal Enactments
1. Jurisdiction of the Court
The Constitutional Court was originally empowered to examine the consti-
tutionality of the following categories of legal enactments: 1) interna-
tional treaties of the Russian Federation that had not yet been ratified; 2)
statutes and other legal enactments of the Congress of People's Deputies,
the Supreme Soviet, or the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Rus-
sian Federation; 3) other legal enactments of supreme organs of the Rus-
sian Federation, including the President and the Council of Ministers; and
4) statutes and other legal enactments of supreme state organs of the
republics. 44
The Court was subsequently45 granted the power to decide all juris-
dictional conflicts between federal and republic organs. It was also
empowered to examine the constitutionality of enactments of subordinate
federal, republic, and autonomous administrative organs, as well as the
constitutionality of treaties between republics and between all other terri-
torial units. The Court was authorized to examine the constitutionality of
political parties and other social organizations, and it ultimately received
the right to decide all jurisdictional disputes among all state organs.
2. Judicial Practice in Reviewing Legal Enactments
Through the end of April 1993, the Court handed down eleven opinions
on the constitutionality of legal enactments, all of which declared the
examined legal enactments (or parts of such) unconstitutional. One of
these decisions was directed against a republic (Tatarstan),46 one against
an ordinance of the Council of Ministers,47 one against a resolution of the
Congress of People's Deputies, 48 two against the Supreme Soviet4 9 and
two against its Presidium,5 0 and four against decrees of President Yeltsin. 51
In May, June, and September 1993, the Court added eight more cases to
43. Interview with Chairman Valerii Zorkin (April 1993).
44. Old Law, supra note 23, art. 57.
45. The powers were added by constitutional amendment on April 21, 1992. Old
Const., supra note 2, art. 165. The Law on the Constitutional Court was not adapted to
reflect this constitutional change, but the Constitution was considered to be immedi-
ately applicable.
46. Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 13, Item No. 671 (1992).
47. Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 28, Item No. 1634 (1992).
48. Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 18, Item No. 653 (1993) (Referendum case).
49. Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 27, Item No. 1571 (1992); Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 23,
Item No. 1247 (1992).
50. Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 21, Item No. 1141 (1992); Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 15,
Item No. 536 (1993).
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this list.5 2
3. The Referendum Case
One of the most interesting and fateful decisions of the Court was
undoubtedly its opinion of April 21, 1993, 53 concerning the constitution-
ality of the Referendum Resolution passed by the Congress of People's
Deputies on March 29.
5 4
In the preceding months, several attempts had been made by Presi-
dent Yeltsin to come to an accord with Parliament concerning a new Con-
stitution or at least ajoint procedure for submitting its basic provisions to
a popular referendum. After these attempts had failed, the President sub-
mitted to the Congress on March 7, 1993, the following questions for a
referendum to be held on April 11, 1993:
1. Do you agree that the Russian Federation should be a presidential
republic?
2. Do you agree that the supreme legislative body of the Russian Federa-
tion should be a bicameral parliament?
3. Do you agree that the new Constitution of the Russian Federation
should be adopted by a Constitutional Assembly representing the mul-
tinational people of the Russian Federation?
4. Do you agree that every citizen of the Russian Federation should have
the right to own, use, and dispose of land as its owner?
55
On March 13, the Congress of People's Deputies rejected the Presi-
dent's proposal and forbade the referendum.5 6 In a radio and television
51. Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 6, Item No. 247 (1992); Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 11,
Item No. 400 (1993); Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 9, Item No. 344 (1993); Vedomosti RF,
Issue No. 17, Item No. 621 (1993).
52. Chukhotsk case, Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 28, Item No. 1083 (1993) (upholding
a federal law as constitutional); Freedom of the Word in Radio, TV, and Information
Services case, Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 30, Item No. 1182 (1993) (partially invalidating
a Congressional resolution); Indexation of Salaries and Savings case, Vedomosti RF,
Issue No. 29, Item No. 1142 (1993) (upholding the constitutionality of a federal law,
Congress and Supreme Soviet resolutions, and a presidential decree); Mordvinia case,
Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 30, Item No. 1183 (1993) (upholding a republic law as consti-
tutional, striking down a presidential decree as unconstitutional); Cheliabinsk case,
Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 27, Item No. 1044 (1993) (invalidating a Supreme Soviet reso-
lution); Privatization of Power Stations case, Reuters, Court Rules Against Yeltsin As Dacha
Row Drags On, Sept. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File (invalidat-
ing a presidential decree); Cossacks case, Reuters, For Once, Constitutional Court Favours
Yeltsin, Sept. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File (upholding a presi-
dential decree); the North-Osetia case, Interfax News Agency, Sept. 17, 1993, available
in LEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB File (striking down a resolution of the North-Osetian
parliament).
53. Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 18, Item No. 653 (1993).
54. Congress Res. No. 4684-I, Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 14, Item No. 501 (1993). I
had the opportunity to listen to the day-long oral proceedings in the Constitutional
Court, and to talk with representatives of the parties, experts, and judges, including
Chairman Zorkin, before, during, and after the hearing. I am still proud of the fact
that I was able to predict correctly the Court's opinion on all counts.
55. Otto Latsis, B. Yeltsin Asks the People Four Questions, IzvESrA, Mar. 10, 1993, at 1,
translated in 45 CuRRNTr DIG. OF THE POST-SoVIET PREss No. 9, at 6 (1993).
56. Congress Res. No. 4629-I, Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 12, Item No. 442 (1993).
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address on March 20,5 7 the President announced a referendum for April
25 on the people's confidence in the President and Vice-President, the
basic provisions of a new Constitution, a new electoral law, and the elec-
tion of a new bicameral parliament. Yeltsin announced that until the reso-
lution of the state crisis a "special administrative regime" would be in
force, under which all orders of the President would be unchallengeable.
The first reaction of the Congress was an impeachment proceeding
against the President on March 28 which failed by a narrow margin.58
The vote was 617 to 268. A successful impeachment would have required
689 votes, two-thirds of the 1033 total deputies. 59 The Congress then
decided to order a referendum with a different set of questions that were
clearly designed to hurt the President:60
1. Do you trust the President of the Russian Federation?
2. Do you approve of the social-economic policy carried out by the Presi-
dent and government of the Russian Federation since 1992?
3. Do you deem it necessary to hold early presidential elections?
4. Do you deem it necessary to hold early elections for people's
deputies?6 1
The Congressional Resolution decreed 62 that a referendum on these
questions would be conducted on the basis of the RSFSR Law on the Ref-
erendum of October 16, 1990.63 The resolution went on to state that
"decisions... are considered to have been adopted, if more than one half
of the citizens entitled to be registered have voted in favor of them."64
On April 8, the constitutionality of this resolution was challenged in a
petition to the Constitutional Court by ten deputies belonging to the par-
liamentary caucus "Democratic Russia," which usually supported the Presi-
dent. They argued that the resolution violated the Referendum Law,
which ordinarily required a majority of the citizens who participated in the
referendum. Under the Referendum Law, a majority of those registered is
required only for questions concerning the adoption or amendment of
the Constitution of the Russian Federation. The petitioners claimed that
none of the referendum questions concerned a change of the Constitu-
tion. Thus, insofar as the resolution deviated from the Law on the Refer-
endum, it violated Article 5 of the Constitution, which required referenda
to be held on the basis of the Constitution and the laws of the Russian
Federation. It did not provide for regulation by resolution. The resolu-
tion also violated Article 4 of the Constitution, which required all state
organs (including the Congress) to observe the Constitution and the laws.
57. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
58. For the Constitutional Court's reaction, see infra text accompanying notes 80-
91.
59. RFE/RL NEws BIUFs, Mar. 29-Apr. 2, 1993, at 1.
60. Congress Res. No. 4684-I, Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 14, Item No. 501 (1993).
61. See RFE/RL Nrms BRIF, supra note 59, at 2.
62. Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 14, Item No. 501, Para. 1 (1993).
63. Vedomosti RSFSR, Issue No. 21, Item No. 230 (1990).
64. Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 14, Item No. 501, Para. 2 (1993).
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In the Constitutional Court's oral proceedings of April 20, two profes-
sors of constitutional law testified as experts and were extensively ques-
tioned by the judges. Professor Anatolii Kovler, of the Institute of State
and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, argued for the petitioners.
Professor Boris Lazarev, from the same institution, defended the respon-
dent. A key issue was the hierarchy of sources of the law: Does a resolu-
tion of the Congress rank above a statute of the Supreme Soviet, or, in
other words, do all legal acts of the Congress enjoy supreme force, regard-
less of their labels? This view had been undisputed under Soviet constitu-
tional doctrine and practice. Another fundamental issue was whether
referendum questions three and four concerning early elections implied a
change of the Constitution, as the latter did not envisage a resignation of
the President or a dissolution of Parliament before the expiration of their
respective terms of office.
In its opinion 65 announced on April 21, the Court affirmed the con-
stitutionality of the Congress' resolution on the vote-counting procedure
issue in questions three and four with five of the thirteen justices dissent-
ing (Ametistov, Morshchakova, Kononov, Oleinik, and Vitruk).66 Con-
cerning questions one and two, the Court unanimously found a violation
of Constitutional Articles 4 and 5. Thus the Court for the first time invali-
dated parts of a normative act of the Congress as unconstitutional. The
Court found these violations even though Article 104 of the Constitution
refers to the Congress as the supreme organ of state power which may
decide any question and may repeal any act of the Supreme Soviet, and
even though Article 109 of the Constitution expressly states that laws and
resolutions of the Supreme Soviet must not contradict laws and resolu-
tions of the Congress.
This ruling of the Constitutional Court, as one Moscow newspaper
wrote,6 7 offered the President a lifesaver: Yeltsin could not have won the
vote of confidence in the referendum 68 but for the Court's decision con-
ceming the vote count. But the Court's opinion also expressed an impor-
tant legal doctrine: a statute ranks as superior to other legal enactments.
It thus wrote a chapter of constitutional law that moved Russia closer to
the West European rule of law model.
The five dissenting justices who denied that referendum questions
three and four had constitutional quality, pointed, with good reason, to
technical arguments supporting their position. These include the fact that
the questions contained no specific proposal for constitutional change
and no specific time for early elections.69 In reaching its decision, the
65. Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 18, Item No. 653 (1993).
66. IzvEsrnA, Apr. 22, 1993, at 1.
67. A. Ostapchuk, El'tsin poluchil spasitel'nyi krug, NEzAVisIMAA GAzETA, Apr. 23,
1993, at 1.
68. See Georgi Ivanov-Smolensky, Referendum Gives Yeltsin Vote of Confidence, IzvrFtsA,
Apr. 28, 1993, at 2, translated in 45 CuRRENT DIG. OF THE PosT-SovE PREss No. 17, at 1
(1993).
69. Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 18, Item No. 653 (1993) (dissenting opinions ofJus-
tices Morshchakova and Ametistov).
1995 A "New" Russian Constitutional Court
Court majority probably reflected on the unconstitutional measures a ref-
erendum victory of the President might entail, in particular the schedul-
ing of parliamentary elections against the will of Parliament. Such
reflections had already guided the Court in its March 23 finding concern-
ing Yeltsin's March 20 television address. 70
C. Nonjudicial Functions of the 1991 Constitutional Court
In a manner unprecedented in Western legal traditions, the Law on the
Russian Constitutional Court assigned no fewer than five types of nonjudi-
cial functions to the Court.7 ' One of these, the finding (zakliuchenie), mer-
its a closer look at this point. Among the several types of findings to be
issued by the Court,72 the most important was the one concerning the
constitutionality of actions and decisions of the President in the context of
an impeachment procedure. 73 Surprisingly, the Court could issue such
findings on its own initiative 74 and thus become an important political
player in its own right.
Prior to September 21, 1993,75 the Constitutional Court had issued
only one finding, which, however, had a spectacular quality and effect. It
deeply divided the Court and had a profound impact on the future polit-
ical development of the country. The finding76 concerned President Yelt-
sin's March 20, 1993, television address.77 In that speech the President
explained his decision to order a referendum concerning the question of
confidence in the President and Vice-President. The main reason for the
political crisis in the country, he said, was not a conflict between the Con-
gress and the President, but a conflict between the people and the Bolshe-
vik system. The Congress, Yeltsin claimed, had manipulated the
Constitution and blocked the referendum on land ownership and consti-
70. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 247-51 and accompanying text.
72. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation:
will issue opinions on the inability of a federal official to discharge the duties of
his office because of a persistent health problem on the recommendations of a
state medical commission; the presence of grounds for the removal of the fed-
eral official concerned from office, as well as an official of a republic, kray,
oblast, autonomous oblast, or autonomous okrug; the constitutionality of
signed international treaties of the Russian Federation prior to their ratification
or approval.
Old Const., supra note 2, art. 165.1.
73. The Old Constitution provided that
The President of the Russian Federation may be removed from office if he vio-
lates the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the laws of the Russian Federa-
tion, and his oath of office. The decision will be made by the Congress of
People's Deputies of the Russian Federation on the basis of an opinion of the
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation ....
Old Const., supra note 2, art. 121.10.
74. Old Law, supra note 23, [ 1-2.
75. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
76. Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 13, Item No. 466 (1993).
77. Boris Yeltsin Offers the Country a Peaceful Way Out of the Crisi, RossiISKIE VESTi,
Mar. 23, 1993, at 1-2, translated in 45 CuRRENT DIG. OF THE PoSr-SovIEr PRESs No. 12, at
1-4 (1993).
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tutional principles. Yeltsin argued that as the possibility of agreement with
the conservative majority in Parliament had been exhausted, the President
would assume direct responsibility for the fate of the country. It was his
duty to guarantee the observation of fundamental constitutional princi-
ples such as popular government, federalism, separation of powers,
human rights, and basic freedoms. Yeltsin continued:
Today I have signed a decree on a special administrative regime7 8 until
the resolution of the crisis of power. On the basis of this decree a referen-
dum is ordered for April 25 concerning confidence in the President and
Vice President of the RF .... The people must decide... who should rule
the country: the President and Vice President or the Congress of People's
Deputies.
Together with the vote of confidence in the President a vote on the
draft of a new constitution and on the draft of the law on elections to Parlia-
ment will be held. These drafts will be submitted by the President and will
become effective when the people support the President and Vice
President.
Under the Constitution and the new electoral law which you will
approve there will be no elections to Congress but to a new Russian parlia-
ment. Under the new Constitution there will be no Congress. Until new
elections can be held, Congress and the Supreme Soviet will not be dis-
solved, their work will not be suspended. The people's deputies will retain
their mandates. But on the basis of the decree all decisions of organs or
functionaries that aim at abolishing or suspending decrees and orders of
the President or ordinances of the government will be without legal
effect.79
Constitutional Court Chairman Zorkin considered this television
statement an attempted coup d'6tat.80 The Court, on its own initiative
(which was subsequently endorsed by a request from the Supreme
Soviet), 8 ' examined the television clip in an emergency session. Presi-
dent Yeltsin refused to attend this session or to submit documents
requested by the Court, including the text of his decree.8 2
In its nine-to-three opinion of March 23 (Ametistov, Morshchakova,
and Vitruk dissented and Kononov was absent), the Court found seven
violations of the Constitution and the Union Treaty in the President's
address.83 The Court, however, remained silent on the question of
impeachment. Justices Ametistov8 4 and Morshchakova wrote dissenting
78. Osobyi poriadok upravleniia.
79. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
80. See Four Top Officials Oppose Yeltsin in TV Appearance, Reuters, Mar. 21, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File.
81. See Khasbulatov Clarifies Possible Further Steps by Parliament, TASS, Mar. 22, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, TASS File.
82. See Alexander Krasulin, Zorkin: Constitutional Court Examines President's Appea
ITAR-TASS, Mar. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, TASS File.
83. Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 13, Item No. 466 (1993), translated in Constitutional
Court's Ruling on Yeltsin's Action, # SU/1646/C2, Mar. 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, BBCSWB File.
84. Cf Constitutional Court Member Sets Out Criticism of Courts Judgment, # SU/1648/
Cl, Mar. 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB File.
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opinions8 5 which considered the speech a mere declaration of political
intent that was not subject to legal evaluation.86 In article 1(3), the Law
on the Constitutional Court forbids the Court to examine political ques-
tions.87 Under article 32 (6), the Court does not have the right to review
unadopted enforceable enactments.88 Also, under article 74(3), it is for-
bidden to pass findings on questions which may later be subject to review
of an enforceable enactment.8 9 Justice Ametistov also correctly criticized
as illegal the various public statements made by Chairman Zorkin in a
press conference, on television, and in the Supreme Soviet prior to the
Court's deliberations. Article 20(3) of the Law on the Constitutional
Court expressly states that:
A judge on the RSFSR Constitutional Court does not have the right any-
where except at a session of the RSFSR Constitutional Court to voice pub-
licly his opinion on a question under review or accepted for review by the
RSFSR Constitutional Court before the adoption of a ruling by it on this
question.90
Further, article 18(1) (4) provides that a judge may be suspended by the
Court for this behavior.91
D. Critique of the Zorkin Court's Judicial Activity
In the first sixteen months of its activity, from November 1991 to April
1993, the Court issued seventeen decisions. This output represents a mod-
est achievement by any standard, especially in view of the large number of
highly qualified legal personnel working for the Court.92 From May to
September of 1993, the Court added eight more opinions to its record,
thereby barely exceeding the meager record of its predecessor, the Com-
mittee of Constitutional Supervision of the USSR 93 A partial explanation
of this limited accomplishment may be found in the Court's rules of pro-
cedure. These rules, written into the Law by an inexperienced draftsman,
Sergei Pashin, forced the Court to: 1) take all decisions in plenary meet-
ings; 2) decide all cases after extensive trial-type public oral hearings; and
85. The dissenting opinions were not printed in Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 13, Item
No. 466 (1993).
86. President Yeltsin's subsequently published Decree of March 24 makes no refer-
ence to a "special administration" and an obvious attempt to avoid all conflict with the
Constitution. On the Activity of Executive Bodies Pending the Resolution of the Crisis, IzvFS-
TIIA, Mar. 25, 1993, at 1, translated in 45 CuRRENT Dic. Or THE POST-SOVIET PREss No. 12,
at 11-12 (1993).
87. Old Law, supra note 23, art. 1, 3.
88. Id. art. 36, 6.
89. Id. art. 74, 3.
90. Id. art. 20, 3.
91. Id. art. 18, 1.4.
92. Like its Western counterparts, the Russian Constitutional Court was undoubt-
edly able to attract some of the brightest young lawyers as well as some very experienced
former members and staff of the Committee of Constitutional Supervision. Yet on my
visit in April 1993, Professor Strashun, senior consultant to Chairman Zorkin, claimed
that a number of staff positions had not been filled for lack of qualified legal personnel.
93. The Committee adopted 23 additional decisions between June 1990 and
December 1991.
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3) abstain from dealing with other cases as long as an ongoing proceeding
was not finished. Thus, these rules blocked the Court from deciding other
cases during the hearings and recesses of the Communist Party case 94
between May 25 and November 30, 1992.
Yet perhaps the focus should be less on the number of cases decided
than on the vision projected by the Court, its public image, and its power
of legal and political persuasion. Given the lack of enforcement of the
Court's opinions, the decision to refrain from publishing a great number
of ineffectual decisions may have been wise. But one could certainly argue
that the Court should have made its legal points more guardedly and
selectively, and that it could have built a more impressive record in the
field of civil rights protection.
There was certainly legitimate frustration on the part of the Court
over the widespread neglect of its decisions. This frustration may help
explain Chairman Zorkin's excessive language and public posturing,
which included giving apocalyptic speeches in the Supreme Soviet,95
imposing fines for contempt of court, and threatening impeachment
against the highest public officials. 96 However, more restraint might have
preserved a higher degree of Court authority.97
Initially, the substance of the Court's opinions reflected a fair amount
of solid legal work, political sensitivity, and capacity for compromise on
the part of the justices. However, since the Communist Party case, the
growing politicization of the Court's judicial decisionmaking became
increasingly troubling.98
94. Cf Yuri Feofanov, The Establishment of the Constitutional Court in Russia and the
Communist Party Case, 19 REv. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 623 (1993); Robert Sharlet, The Rus-
sian Constitutional Court: TheFirst Term, 9 PoSr-SoviEr AmFnAts 1 (1993); Mark Brzezinski,
Toward "Constitutionalism" in Russia: The Russian Constitutional Cour 42 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 673, 683-87 (1993). On earlier decisions of the Court, see Hausmaninger II, supra
note 21, at 333; see also Herman Schwartz, The New East European Constitutional Courts, 13
MICH.J. INT'L L. 741, 763-78 (1992).
95. Cf Zorkin Warns of Civil War, RFE/RL NEwS BsuEss, Apr. 13-16, 1993, at 3.
96. See Robert Sharlet, ChiefJustice as Judicial Politician, E. EUR. CONSr. REv., Spring
1993, at 32.
97. For example, Zorkin's handling of the Tatarstan case had the unfortunate con-
sequence that other state organs ignored Court decisions. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note
94, at 768-75; Sharlet, supra note 96, at 33. In the Communist Party case, the Court was
unable to force Gorbachev to appear as a witness. As a result, the public image of the
Court suffered serious damage. See id. at 33-34; Brzezinski, supra note 94, at 286-87; and
Feofanov, supra note 94, at 636.
98. This politicization especially occurred in the National Salvation Front case of
Feb. 12, 1993. Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 9, Item No. 344 (1993). In this case, the court
majority ignored the unconstitutional contents of the Front's program, and focused
exclusively on the unconstitutional character of the presidential decree outlawing the
Front. Cf Feofanov, supra note 94, at 634. See also Mordvinia case, Vedomosti RF, Issue
No. 30, Item No. 1183 (1993). Cf Valentin Razboinikov, Mordvinia Abolishes the Position
of Presiden IzvE ITA, Apr. 7, 1993, at 2, translated in 45 CURRENT Dic. OF THE POST-
SoviET PRESS No. 14, at 12-13 (1993).
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E. Critical Remarks Concerning the Court's Nonjudicial Activities
There is no doubt that the Court's exercise of nonjudicial functions led to
excessive political involvement outside the Court's core function of judi-
cial review. This development certainly did not add to the Constitutional
Court's legal authority and prestige.
When the Court began to function in early 1992, I argued that the
Court should perform its educational function in the legal and political
system primarily through clear, well-crafted opinions.99 The creation of a
legal culture among the population should have been left to legal schol-
ars. It was not a task to be accomplished by press conferences and televi-
sion interviews of Chairman Zorkin.
In the following months, Zorkin increasingly confirmed my fears by
developing a kind of political activism that was at times clearly in violation
of the law and at least improper for a neutral arbiter of constitutional
conflict. But there is also a caveat to be considered in view of the Court's
role in an emerging constitutional crisis. Is it really permissible in an
extraordinary situation of this type to evaluate the Russian Constitutional
Court on the basis of those standards that apply to Western Constitutional
Courts in normal times?
Many observers agree that in December 1992 the Chairman of the
Constitutional Court justifiably received ample public praise for assuming
the role of referee in a dramatic struggle between the legislature and the
President and for substantially contributing to the finding of a compro-
mise.100 However, it appears that Zorkin extensively enjoyed the limelight
and the power involved in playing this active role. He did not abide by
the agreement, formalized in a resolution adopted by the Congress on
December 13, 1992.101 As early as January, Zorkin was among the first to
join Speaker Khasbulatov in voicing doubts and criticism concerning the
constitutional referendum scheduled for April 11, 1993.102
In the eyes of a critical and liberal Russian intelligentsia, this support
for Speaker Khasbulatov was an unforgivable betrayal. In their view,
Zorkin had clearly aligned himself politically with a reactionary parliament
in its struggle against a reform-minded President. A more neutral
observer would agree that Zorkin not only assumed a partisan political
role inappropriate for the country's highest judge, but also undermined
the Court's prestige as signatory to a solemn constitutional agreement.
99. See Hausmaninger II, supra note 21, at 337.
100. See Sharlet, supra note 96, at 35.
101. On the Stabilization of the Russian Federation's Constitutional System, RosssKArA
GAZErA, Dec. 15, 1992, at 1; Vedomosdi RF, Issue No. 51, Item No. 3016 (1992), trans-
lated in 44 CuRRENT DIG. OF THE Posr-SoviEr PRsS No. 50, at 8-9 (1992).
102. Cf Ruslan Khasbulatov, The Congress of People s Deputies and the Referendum, Rossi-
ISKAIA GAZETA, Jan. 10, 1993, at 2, translated in 45 CuRREN DIG. OF THE POST-SOvET
PmRsS No. 2, at 7-8 (1993); Zorkin v. Referendum; Communists v. Khasbulatov, RFE/RL
NEWs BRmrs, Jan. 25-29, 1993, at 4; Anna Ostapchuk, Valerii Zorkin Shows Caution,
NEzAvIsmAIA GAzETA, Feb. 11, 1993, at 1, translated in 45 CuRRENTr DIG. OF THE POsr-
SoVIET PREss No. 6, at 6-7 (1993).
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Some Western scholars expressed their criticism in stronger terms. 10 3 But
any censure directed at the Chairman should be mindful of the fact that
Zorkin, for most of his activities, enjoyed the support of a solid Court
majority.104
In their struggle with Parliament, President Yeltsin and his supporters
frequently insisted that without radical economic reform a stable demo-
cratic society cannot develop, and that without a democratic society no
functioning rule of law can exist. Did this perspective give legitimacy to
the President's revolutionary transformation that disregarded the existing
Constitution, the elected Parliament, and a lawfully appointed and func-
tioning Constitutional Court?
Although it could be claimed that the President's actions were subse-
quently endorsed by the popular referendum on his draft of a new Consti-
tution, 10 5 an impartial observer could give his endorsement only with
great reluctance. He would at the same time deplore the lack of political
culture and place blame on all three major players in the power struggle:
the Parliament, the President, and the Constitutional Court.
1. The Parliament
The Russian Parliament was elected under Gorbachev in 1990 when elec-
tions were still open to considerable Communist Party manipulation. At
that time, the most progressive Russian politicians competed for seats in
the Soviet Parliament, and Russian Republic politics were considered pro-
vincial. In contrast, President Yeltsin was elected on June 12, 1991 by a
substantial popular majority after Russia had declared sovereignty.' 0 6 The
referendum of April 25, 1993 clearly confirmed Yeltsin's mandate.
In 1992 and 1993, the Russian Parliament under Speaker Khasbulatov
demonstrated increasing political irresponsibility, ultimately imposing a
ruinous hyper-inflationary budget on the government'0 7 and plotting to
remove the President.l0 8 Yeltsin had to act forcefully and decisively while
he still retained the power to do so.
103. One commentator wrote: "... . Valery Zorkin, the Court's either ill-fated, ill-
advised or evilminded chairman, who for the past half year had discredited the Court by
siding with Ruslan Khasbulatov and Aleksandr Rutskoi in conflicts between Boris Yeltsin
and the anti-Yeltsin forces in the Supreme Soviet .... " Alexander Blankenagel, The
Court Writes Its Own Law, 3 (3/4) E. EUR. CONST. REV., Fall 1994, at 74.
104. Id. at 78.
105. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
106. Declaration on State Sovereignty of the RSFSR, Vedomosti RSFSR, Issue No. 2,
Item No. 22 (1990).
107. Cf Parliament's "Populist"Budget Awash in Red Ink, 45 CuRRENT DIG. OF THE PosT-
SovrT PREss No. 29, at 7-10 (1993); Budget Deadlock: Financial Stabilization in Peri 45
CuRRENT DIG. OF THE PoST-SovEr PRsSS No. 34, at 11-13 (1993); Battle Over Budget,
Economic Policy Rages On, 45 CuRRENT DIG. OF THE Posr-Sovr PREss No. 35, at 8-10
(1993).
108. Cf Observers Suggest Yeltsin's Impeachment Imminen RFE/RL NEws BRIEFS, Aug.
23-27, 1993, at 3; Yurii Orlik, Wat We Can Expect From the Russian President's September
Offensive, IzvEsrilA, Sept. 10, 1993, translated in 45 CuRRE.NT DIG. OF THE POST-SovIET
PREss No. 36, at 11 (1993).
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But it should not be overlooked that for a long time this very parlia-
ment had acceded to President Yeltsin's every wish and granted him
extraordinary powers.' 0 9 Parliament only withdrew its support and ulti-
mately opposed Yeltsin after the government had committed grave blun-
ders and the President continued to treat Parliament highhandedly
instead of trying to seek compromise.
2. The President
President Yeltsin's supporters have argued that the Constitutional Court
majority employed legal formalism to aid an illegitimate parliament to the
detriment of a reformist executive. There is some truth in this charge. It
may be explained in part by the formalist tradition in Soviet jurispru-
dence, in part by the political preferences of the justices, and also as a
reaction to the arrogant behavior of Yeltsin and his team. The brusque
and frequently insulting style of the President and his advisers," 0 the
improvisation and shortsightedness of some of Yeltsin's previous political
actions, his personal lack of appreciation of law and legality, and the poor
legal quality of many of his decrees 1 ' increasingly alienated Yeltsin from
the Russian legal community, including the justices of the Constitutional
Court.
3. The Constitutional Court
The Russian Constitution of 1978 had been amended in some parts, but
remained obsolete and contradictory in others. The Constitutional
Court's work thus lacked an adequate legal and political foundation.
When Parliament refused to finalize a draft constitution which would pro-
vide for a viable executive, Yeltsin needed to find a way to adopt a new
Constitution without Parliament's participation. Perhaps a more construc-
tive effort on the part of the Constitutional Court would have helped avoid
this revolutionary act.
The activity of Zorkin and other meinbers of the Court must be con-
sidered in the light of the political crises of 1992-93. These crises demon-
strate reforms in Russia will not be successful without a fundamental
change in the mindset of political leaders and the general population. In
particular, politicians must be willing to learn the ground rules of a
democracy based upon separation of powers and a system of checks and
balances. The government must work towards increasing public political
consciousness and building support among the people over time. Any
evaluation of the reform process should take into account the fact that, by
necessity, there will be an extended period of trial and error.
109. See, e.g., Vedomosti RSFSR, Issue No. 44, Item No. 1456; Yeltsin Voted SpecialPow-
ers for Reform, 43 CuRRENT DiG. oF THE SovIET PRESS No. 44, at 7 (1991).
110. In March 1992, President Yeltsin stated that he had lost trust in the Court and
would therefore no longer submit petitions to it In the following summer he took away
Zorkin's dacha. See Zorkin Given Until 13th Sept. to Vacate his Dacha, BBC Report No. SU/
1791/B, Sept. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB File.
111. For a general criticism voiced in the Constitutional Court opinion of February
12, 1993, see Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 9, Item No. 344 (1993).
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Through December 1992, the Russian Court generally maintained
respectability as a defender of the constitutional order.' 12 However, dur-
ing 1993 the Court's partisanship may have prevented a political compro-
mise between the legislature and the executive which the President
unsuccessfully had sought to obtain.
Zorkin and his Court ultimately were unable to chart and safeguard a
legal road to political change. It is unclear whether the Court deserves
credit for a constructive contribution to the political reform process in
Russia. The Court's fundamental decision to support Khasbulatov's parlia-
ment over President Yeltsin forced the President to delay his coup and
find a stronger base of legitimacy for his transitional dictatorship. The
President ultimately benefitted from this challenge much the way he capi-
talized on the political blunders of his enemies in Parliament after Sep-
tember 21, 1993, by consolidating his power and strengthening his
mandate. October 1993 marked a new political beginning, with new
opportunities to be seized or missed, and a new succession of crises, which
may well prove to be the "normal" pattern of Russian politics, just as "mud-
dling through" has been and will be in the future the more or less success-
ful recipe for dealing with them.
The current trend, unfortunately, seems to de-emphasize constitu-
tionality and the rule of law, but these principles will no doubt eventually
see a renaissance. Reflecting upon this period of history, future genera-
tions may well conclude that any Constitutional Court would have faced a
"mission impossible." 1i Thus, a future assessment of the Zorkin Court
may well accord it a respectable place in the development of a Russian
legal culture.
H. The Constitutional Court in the New Constitution
The Russian Constitution (the New Constitution), adopted by popular ref-
erendum on December 12, 1993, contains new provisions in Article 125
concerning the Constitutional Court. 1 4 Unlike Articles 126 and 127
which define the Supreme Court as "the highest organ for civil, criminal,
administrative jurisdiction" and the Supreme Court of Arbitration as "the
highest judicial organ for the resolution of economic disputes," Article
125 refrains from labeling the Constitutional Court as the "highestjudicial
organ regarding the protection of the constitutional system," as its role was
described in Article 165 of the previous Russian Constitution. 115
112. But see supra notes 94 and 98 (commentary expressing reservations with regard
to the handling of the Communist Party and National Front cases).
113. During my stay in Moscow in April 1993, I asked justices as well as legal scholars
whether they thought that perhaps the Constitutional Court had been prematurely
established in an underdeveloped Russian political system. The question was not
understood.
114. See New Const., supra note 12, art. 125.
115. Article 125 of the New Constitution begins without defining the scope of the
Constitutional Court's jurisdiction: "1. The Constitutional Court of the RF consists of
19judges .... " Id. But article 1 of the new Constitutional Law on the Constitutional
Court of the Russian Federation ofJuly 21, 1994 seems to make up at least in part for
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The New Constitution increases the number ofjustices from fifteen,
only thirteen of whom were actually appointed, to nineteen. 1 16 It also
enumerates the state organs and persons that have access to the Court, 117
and lists the competencies of the Court.118 The language of Article 125 is
more concise than that of the Old Constitution, and it restricts the powers
of the Court in several instances.' 1 9 However, it also provides a founda-
tion for new avenues of access and a broader civil rights jurisdiction for
the Constitutional Court.'2 0
According to Article 128 of the New Constitution, justices of the Con-
stitutional Court are nominated by the President and appointed by the
upper house of Parliament, the Council of the Federation.' 2 ' Under the
provisions of this article, a federal constitutional law is to define the pow-
ers and to prescribe procedures for the formation and activity of the
Court.1 22 Under Item 2 of Article 108, a federal constitutional law
the original omission: "The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation is ajudicial
organ of constitutional review, which autonomously and independently exercises judi-
cial power by means of constitutional law procedure." The Constitutional Law on the
Constitutional Court, SZ RF Issue No. 13, Item No. 1447 (1994), translated in FBIS-SOV-
94-145-S, July 28, 1994 [hereinafter New Law].
116. TheJuly 1993 Draft had provided for 18justices. July Draft, supra note 14, art.
125.
117. TheJuly Draft did not contain provisions concerning access. Id.
118. New Const., supra note 12, art. 125.
119. For example, the Court may no longer determine the constitutionality of
actions and decisions of the highest officials of the Russian Federation and its members,
nor may it issue findings concerning the presence of grounds for their removal from
office. In addition, the Court lost the right to examine the constitutionality of political
parties and public associations. Also, deputies of parliament and public associations
may no longer contest the constitutionality of statutes and other normative acts. The
drafters probably imposed most of these restrictions in reaction to the Court's excessive
politicization and, in particular, the Chairman's activities during the preceding two
years.
The December version of the Constitution implemented significant changes from
earlier drafts. For instance, the July Draft provided for jurisdiction over issues such as
the constitutionality of the establishment and the activity of public associations, as well
as broader jurisdiction over sublegislative enactments. July Draft, supra note 14, art.
125.
120. The Constitution envisions a role for the Court as protector of constitutional
rights. It foresees a Court which will hear not only citizens' complaints, but also consti-
tutional questions certified by the ordinary courts. New Const., supra note 12, art.
125(4). However, this authority depends upon enactment of specific procedures by
federal law. See infra note 207.
121. New Const., supra note 12, art. 128(1). The previous Law on the Constitutional
Court had provided for nomination by the Chairman of the Congress of People's Depu-
ties and election by the Congress. Old Law, supra note 23, art. 3, 1.
122. New Const., supra note 12, art. 128(3). The New Constitution does not define
the purpose and scope of a constitutional law nor does it describe its position in the
hierarchy of norms. If the French loi organiquewas a model used by the drafters of the
Russian Constitution, then the constitutional law may only elaborate, but cannot
change, the Constitution. Therefore, Chetvemin holds the mistaken view that constitu-
tional laws are adopted under the same provisions as constitutional amendments and
should have the same force. SeeVladimir Chetvernin, Three Questions to theAuthors of the
Act E. EUR. CONsT. REgv., Fall 1994, at 80. In fhct, under the New Constitution, amend-
ments require an additional approval by two-thirds of the members of the RF. New
Const., supra note 12, art. 136.
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requires the approval of three-fourths of the deputies in the Council of the
Federation and two-thirds in the State Duma, the lower house of Parlia-
ment.123 The law then must be signed and promulgated by the President
within fourteen days. 124
Part II of the Constitution, Concluding and Transitional Provisions,
invalidates all preconstitutional legislation to the extent that it contradicts
the New Constitution.125 However, it confirms the office terms of all pre-
viously elected judges, including the thirteen justices serving on the Con-
stitutional Court.1 2 6
M. The Constitutional Law On the Constitutional Court of the
Russian Federation
On February 1, 1994, responding to the President's request as well as exer-
cising its constitutional right of legislative initiative,' 2 7 the Constitutional
Court submitted the Draft Law on the Constitutional Court to the State
Duma (Draft Law). 128 The Draft Law subsequently was modified by a
working group composed of representatives of the Court, the President's
Administration, and the Duma. The group, which also consulted with
Russian and foreign experts,' 29 presented the product of its deliberations
on March 24.130 On April 11, the Duma in its first reading rejected the
Draft Law. It did so because the Draft Law did not provide for input by
the Duma in the selection of justices. However, after striking a political
bargain with the President which granted the Duma the right to propose a
number ofjustices, the Duma approved the Draft Law in its second read-
ing on May 111s' and ultimately adopted the new Federal Constitutional
Law on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation (New Law) in
its third reading on June 24.132 The Council of the Federation approved
the New Law on July 12,133 and PresidentYeltsin signed it onJuly 21. The
New Law became effective on the day of its official publication.' 34
123. New Const., supra note 12, art. 108(2). This quorum is the same as the one
required to amend chapters 3 to 8 of the Constitution itself. Id. art. 136.
124. Id. art 108(2).
125. Id. part II, item 2.
126. Id. item 5.
127. Id. art. 104(1).
128. The Draft, with cover letter by Acting Chairman Vitruk and ten pages of Explan-
atory Remarks, is on file with the author [hereinafter Draft Law].
129. Blankenagel, supra note 103, at 75.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Duma Adopts Law on Constitutional Court, RFE/RL NEws Bluris, June 27-July 1,
1994, at 1.
133. Council of Federation Approves Law on Constitutional Court, RFE/RL NEws BuiFs,
July 11-15, 1994, at 3.
134. SeeArt. 6, Federal Law on the Procedure of Publication and Going into Effect of
Federal Constitutional Laws, SZ RF Issue No. 8, Item No. 801 (1994). The New Consti-
tutional Law on the Constitutional Court was first officially published in RossusKAIA
GAzErA, July 23, 1994, at 4-7. See also New Law, supra note 115, part VI, 1. Note that
part 6, paragraph 2 of the New Law repeals the previous Law on the Constitutional
Court of the RFSFR. Id. part VI, 2.
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Fears of the legal community that the politically fragmented Parlia-
ment elected in December 1993 would be unable to muster the majorities
required to pass a constitutional law were unfounded. Both chambers
voted swiftly and almost unanimously on the New Law, which the Parlia-
ment considered a potentially useful check on the overwhelming constitu-
tional powers possessed by the President.135
The New Law contains six parts, subdivided into fifteen Chapters,
containing 115 Articles: I. Organization of the Court and Status of the
Justices (Ch. I-III, arts. 1-28); II. General Procedural Provisions (Ch. IV-
VIII, arts. 29-83); III. Special Procedures for Different Categories of Cases
(Ch. IX-XV, arts. 84-110); IV. Final Provisions (arts. 111-115); V. Transi-
tional Provisions (paras. 1 to 5); VI. Entry into Force (paras. 1 and 2).136
A. Court Structure and Status of Justices
Chapter I of the New Law contains general provisions, including a list of
no fewer than twelve competencies of the Court.137 The Court needs a
quorum of three-quarters, i.e., fifteen justices, in order to function.' 3 8
Five fundamental principles should guide the Court's activities: indepen-
dence, collegiality, glasnost, adversarial procedure, and equality of the par-
ties.139  Article 7 emphasizes the organizational and financial
independence of the Court from all other state organs.14°
Chapter II contains provisions concerning the status ofjustices. Arti-
cle 8 increases the minimum age from thirty-five to forty14 1 and raises the
required previous legal work experience from ten to fifteen years.142
135. Cf Indira Dunaeva, Law on Constitutional Court Adopted, NEzAvIsIMAiA GAZETA,
June 25, 1994, at 1, translated in 46 CURRENT Di. OF THE PoET-SoviET PREss No. 25, at 17
(1994).
136. The former Law on the Constitutional Court of the RSFSR of July 12, 1991
contained 89 articles grouped in four parts: 1. General Provisions; II. Status ofJustices;
III. Procedure; IV. Concluding Provisions. The new and old law both resemble the
German Law on the Constitutional Court. See German Law, supra note 32. The Ger-
man statute consists of four parts and 107 articles: I. Structure and Jurisdiction; II.
General Procedural Provisions; III. Special Procedural Provisions; IV. Concluding
Provisions.
137. New Law, supra note 115, art. 3.
138. The Draft Law suggested a quorum of two-thirds, i.e., l3justices. This provision
would have enabled the existing Court to function even before the election of new
members. Draft Law, supra note 128, art. 5, 1. Under the formula adopted by the
parliament, at least two more justices had to be elected. New Law, supra note 115, art.
4.
139. New Law, supra note 115, art. 5. Adversarial procedure and equality of the par-
ties are new principles and apparently reflect the Court's self-image as a trial court.
Article 5 of the previous law had listed legality, independence, collegiality, and gasnost.
Old Law, supra note 23, art. 5.
140. Although the Court is separately funded from the federal budget, it handles its
funds independently. The funds may not be reduced from one year to the next. Were
it not for inflation, these new provisions would considerably strengthen the indepen-
dence of the Court.
141. This is the requirement of article 3 of the German Law on the Federal Constitu-
tional Court. See German Law, supra note 32, art. 3.
142. New Law, supra note 115, art. 8. Cf. Old Law, supra note 23, art. 12.
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According to article 9, the Council of the Federation must examine the
candidates nominated by the President within fourteen days. 143 They are
elected by simple majority in a secret ballot. When a vacancy occurs, the
President must nominate a candidate within one month.144 Justices serve
single twelve-year terms of office and must retire at age seventy. 145 This
provision has obviously been inspired by the German model, except that
justices on the German Constitutional Court must retire at age sixty-
eight.146 Under the previous Russian law, the justices were appointed to
serve until age sixty-five; 14 7 the Draft Law submitted by the Court pro-
posed appointment until age seventy, with no term restriction. 148 This
would have corresponded to the Austrian model,' 4 9 but the German solu-
tion seems to be the better one, for a variety of reasons.' 5 0 Part II, Item 5,
of the New Constitution provides for continuity in all judicial organs.'-5
All justices retain their powers for the terms for which they were elected.
Only vacancies are to be filled under the provisions of the New Constitu-
tion. This implies that all thirteen justices of the old Constitutional Court
may continue to serve until age sixty-five,' 5 2 whereas six new appointees 53
will serve for non-renewable twelve-year terms under the New Law (unless
143. New Law, supra note 115, art. 9. The article also specifically lists persons and
organizations that may propose candidates to the President for nomination, e.g., mem-
bers of either house of parliament, regional and municipal legislatures of the Russian
Federation, supreme courts, the All-Russian Bar Association, and law schools. Id. The
Draft submitted by the Court did not contain this clause. It was inserted after the Duma
had rejected the Draft on April 11 and had entered into negotiations with the President
concerning the future influence of the Duma on the nomination process. Whatever
political concessions may have been made are not reflected in the text of article 9: the
President is under no legal obligation to consider the proposals of the Duma or any
other body. See also Blankenagel, supra note 103, at 75.
144. The Draft Law had suggested two months. A one-month period, provided for
by the German Law, supra note 32, art. 5, 3, and adopted under the Russian statute,
would appear to be very short if a serious examination of the legal and moral back-
ground of candidates were intended. Cf Draft Law, supra note 128, art. 9, 4.
145. New Law, supra note 115, art. 12.
146. German Law, supra note 32, art. 4.
147. Old Law, supra note 23, art. 15.
148. Draft Law, supra note 128, art. 12.
149. BUNDES-VERFASSUNOSGESrZ [Constitution] [B-VG] art. 147(6) (as revised),
translated in CONsTr=rrrONS OF THE COUNTMES OF THE WORLD, AusruA (Albert P. Blau-
stein & Gilbert H. Flanz eds., 1985).
150. The average age of the 13 Russian justices when they were elected in 1991 was
50. Thus, on average they would have served for 15 years. More rapid turnover in the
Court's membership is not only likely to make it more responsive to social and political
development, but also to prevent legal petrification at a time when all sitting justices
received their training under the Communist system. From this perspective, raising the
minimum age to 40 may not have been a wise decision.
151. New Const., supra note 12, part II, item 5. President Yeltsin's Decree No. 1612
On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of Oct. 7, 1993, merely sus-
pended the Court's decision-making activity until the new Constitution was adopted.
Yeltsin Decree, supra note 9, at 1.
152. See also New Law, supra note 115, part V, 4.
153. The six were to be elected no later than 30 days after the Constitutional Law
went into effect. Id. part V, 2.
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one should reach the retirement age of seventy during his term) .154 Arti-
cle 11 of the New Law addresses the problem of incompatibility, 55 and
articles 13 to 19 deal with questions of independence,' 56 protection from
dismissal, 15 7 immunity,15s suspension, 159 removal, 16 0 and resignation of
justices.' 6 i
Chapter HI of the New Law is devoted to the structure and organiza-
tion of the Court. Whereas the old Constitutional Court, like most other
Constitutional Courts, worked as a single body, the new Court functions
either in plenary session or in panels.16 2 Similar to the German
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court), which consists
of two permanent panels of eight justices each, 163 the Russian Court is
subdivided into two panels of nine and ten justices respectively. The
Chairman and Deputy-Chairman belong to different panels while the
other justices are assigned by lot.164 The panels may not remain
154. Id. art. 12. Unlike one commentator, this author fails to see "an awkward dis-
crepancy" in this. But see Blankenagel, supra note 103, at 75.
155. Article 11 forbids justices to be deputies to representative organs or to hold
other public office; they must refrain from any other paid activity except teaching or
other academic functions that do not interfere with their work on the Court. Justices
may not belong to political parties or movements or engage in any political activities.
Before the Court delivers its decision, justices may not publicly state their views on
matters that could become cases, or are subject tojudicial examination. New Law, supra
note 115, art. 11.
156. Article 13 of the New Constitutional Law expressly mentions "material guaran-
tees" of independence such as pay, annual leave, housing, social and consumer services,
and health insurance. Id. art. 13. Whereas the Draft Law submitted by the Court pro-
posed elaborate special provisions concerning the material and social security of the
justices, the New Law puts Constitutional Court justices on the same footing as other
top federaljudges. Compare Draft Law, supra note 128, part IV, wvith New Law, supra note
115, art. 13.
157. The New Law, however, permits termination or suspension under certain condi-
tions. New Law, supra note 115, art. 14.
158. Except for arrest at the scene of a crime, justices are not subject to detention,
arrest, investigation, administrative or criminal proceedings without the consent of the
Constitutional Court. Id. art. 15.
159. The Court may suspend ajustice when it consents to an arrest or criminal prose-
cution, or when the justice is temporarily unable to carry out duties because of health
reasons. Suspension from office does not entail suspension of salary. Id. art. 17.
160. Article 18 lists 12 reasons for removal ranging from procedural error in the
justice's appointment (Item 1) to thejustice's death (Item 12). Other reasons include
voluntary resignation, criminal conviction, declaration of incapacity by a final court rul-
ing, "the commission.., of an act that brings the honor and dignity of justices into
disrepute" (Item 6), "the continuation by the justice, despite warnings from the Russian
Federation Constitutional Court, of occupations or actions incompatible with his posi-
tion" (Item 7), and "failure... to take part in ... sessions, or failure to vote more than
twice in succession without a valid reason" (Item 8). As an afterthought to this list,
article 18 adds termination on account of disability for health reasons lasting for more
than 10 consecutive months. The Council of the Federation may terminate ajustice's
tenure under Items 1 and 6 on the basis of a recommendation by the Court. In other
cases the Court itself may adopt the appropriate decision by simple majority. Id. art. 18,
Items 1-12.
161. Article 19 provides for generous retirement benefits. Id. art. 19.
162. Id. art. 20.
163. German Law, supra note 32, art. 2.
164. New Law, supra note 115, art. 20.
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unchanged for more than three years, and the members are to take turns
as presiding justices.16 5
Article 21 specifically lists the competencies of the Russian Court that
are to be exercised exclusively in plenary meetings. Panels may decide all
other cases unless the Court wishes to treat them in plenary session. 1 6
This differs from the German model insofar as in Germany all cases are
decided by the panels, each of which speaks as the Constitutional Court. 167
The Plenum of the Russian Constitutional Court exclusively: a) rules
upon the constitutionality of republic constitutions and charters of other
members of the Russian Federation; b) gives authentic interpretations of
the Constitution; c) determines whether the procedure for impeaching
the President has been observed; and d) exercises legislative initiative on
issues within its jurisdiction. 168 In addition, the Plenum elects the Chair-
man, Deputy-Chairman, and Secretary of the Court by secret ballot for
three-year terms with the right to be re-elected. 169 It assigns personnel
and cases to the panels,170 schedules the work of the Plenary meetings,
adopts Rules of Procedure, and may suspend or dismiss a justice or
remove the Chairman, Deputy-Chairman, or Secretary from their func-
tions. 17 1 The previous law had not provided for a limitation of terms of
the Chairman and the other Court officers. The present provisions are
165. This rule contrasts with the German Law under which the membership of the
two panels cannot be changed. Every German justice is elected to a specific panel.
German Law, supra note 32, art. 2, 2. Under German Law, if one panel lacks a quo-
rum, it may be replenished by temporary assignment ofjustices from the other panel.
Id. art. 15, 2. One panel is chaired by the President, the other by the Vice-President
of the Court. Id. art. 15, 1. The Russian Draft had suggested provisions (subsequently
not adopted) by which justices may be assigned to a panel that lacks a quorum (art. 19,
3), and which would allow a change in the composition of the panels on an annual
basis (art. 19, 5). Draft Law, supra note 128, art. 19, 3, 5.
166. Blankenagel, supra note 103, at 77 ("... leaving to the plenum resolution of (1)
more serious cases or (2) any case when three justices demand it").
167. The Plenum only functions to equalize the caseload and to decide a legal ques-
tion in which one panel wishes to deviate from the legal opinion expressed in a deci-
sion of the other panel. Plenary meetings are very rare. German Law, supra note 32,
art. 14, 4, and art. 16.
168. New Law, supra note 115, art. 21. The Court's Draft had envisioned broader
exclusive powers of the Plenum, including the examination of questions of constitution-
ality of federal laws (with the exception of citizens' complaints and judicial referrals), of
normative acts of the President, and of international treaties that have not yet entered
into force. The Draft also provided the Court with the power to decide jurisdictional
conflicts among federal organs of state power in plenary session and gave the Court the
right to issue messages (poslaniya). Draft Law, supra note 128, art. 20. It remains to be
seen to what extent the justices will make use of their power of assuming plenum juris-
diction in matters primarily assigned to the panels.
169. New Law, supra note 115, art. 23.
170. The Court has retained complete flexibility in assigning cases to either panel,
whereas the German model provides for a fundamental distinction between a Grun-
drechtssenat (civil rights panel) and a Staatsrechtssenat (panel for constitutional law ques-
tions) plus provisions to equalize the workload, i.e. assigning a fair number of civil
rights issues to the other panel. German Law, supra note 32, art. 14.
171. Any suspension or removal requires a showing that the justice violated a duty
and may be requested by five justices. The New Law requires a two-thirds vote to
impose such punishment. The Draft of the Constitutional Court had proposed a three-
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obviously a reaction to Chairman Zorkin's much criticized political
activism.' 72
The jurisdiction of panels includes all competencies of the Court that
have not been expressly assigned to or assumed by the Plenum.' 73 Specifi-
cally, these include: a) ruling upon the constitutionality of federal stat-
utes; normative acts of the President, the Council of the Federation, the
State Duma, and the Government; statutes and other. normative acts of
members of the Russian Federation affecting matters of federal or joint
jurisdiction; treaties between organs of state power of the Russian Federa-
tion and organs of state power of members of the Russian Federation; trea-
ties among members of the Russian Federation; and international treaties
that have not yet entered into force; b) settling jurisdictional disputes
between federal organs of state power; between organs of state power of
the Federation and organs of state power of its members; or among the
highest state organs of members of the Federation; c) examining the con-
stitutionality of laws applied or to be applied to specific cases on the basis
of citizens' complaints alleging the violation of constitutional rights and
freedoms and at the request of the courts.' 74
B. General Procedural Provisions
The general rules of procedure provide for trial-type oral hearings in open
session and explanations by parties as well as testimony from experts and
witnesses.' 75 Sessions in each case are to be held without interruption.
The New Law surprisingly retains the provision of the previous constitu-
tional law that the Constitutional Court may not decide other questions
fourths majority. Compare Draft Law, supra note 128, art. 22, 4, with New Law, supra
note 115, art. 23.
172. The drafters of the Law explain the term limitations imposed on Court officers
as well as the provision that the Court's Chairman does not have the privilege of auto-
matically chairing one of the panels by referring to the principle of equality of the
justices (the Chairman being only "first among equals"). Draft Law, supra note 128, at
6-7 (Explanatory Remarks).
173. New Law, supra note 115, art. 22.
174. The Russian word i ("and") linking the two sentences in Article 125, Paragraph
4 of the Constitution as well as in article 3, paragraph 4 of the Constitutional Law
should obviously be read as "or," since the Constitutional Law sets up two different
procedures in chapters XII (complaints by citizens, arts. 96-100) and XII (referrals by
courts, arts. 101-04). Surprisingly, the Constitutional Law does not mention the reserva-
tion "in the procedure established by federal law," which, incidentally, was also absent
from the July Draft Constitution. The assumption that the Constitutional Law itself
provides this procedure obviously underlies Chetvemin's assessment that the Constitu-
tional Court will be submerged by citizens' complaints, because the Constitutional Law
does not restrict access. Using the same reasoning, Chetvemin also criticizes the lack of
clarity and detail in the regulation ofjudicial referral. Chetvemin, supra note 122, at
81. However, as Professor Leonid S. Mamut of the Institute of State and Law of the
Russian Academy of Sciences explained to me, this interpretation was apparently not
intended by the drafters of the Law and would not correspond to Russian constitutional
law doctrine. This and other problematic issues concerning the relationship between
the Constitution and the new Constitutional Law will perhaps soon be clarified by the
Constitutional Court.
175. New Law, supra note 115, arts. 31-32.
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while the pending case remains unresolved.1 76 The Court is merely
allowed to work concurrently in panels and in plenary session. 177
The New Law permits the Secretariat of the Court summarily to reject
petitions that clearly fall outside the jurisdiction of the Court or are sub-
mitted by unauthorized state organs or persons; the petitioner may
demand a respective decision by the Court.' 78 The Chairman of the Court
assigns all cases to one or several justices for preliminary study to be com-
pleted within two months from the time the appeal is registered. 179 The
justice(s) then report to the plenary session.1 80 The Plenum is to decide
on the adoption of the case for examination within one month from the
completion of the preliminary study.' 8 1
One or several justices prepare a case for hearing, compose a draft
decision, and present materials at the hearing. The reporting justice and
the Chairman decide on the range of witnesses and experts to be sum-
moned or invited to the hearing.182 The petitioner and the respondent
(e.g., the official who signed the contested act) may be represented by
counsel and enjoy equal procedural rights.' 83
A hearing begins with an opening statement of the reporting justice.
The Court then hears the parties' proposals and decides on a procedure
for the examination of the case.' 8 4 The parties are then asked to substan-
tiate their positions with legal argument.185 After presenting experts and
witnesses, the parties deliver their closing statements.' 8 6 The justices then
discuss and vote on the issue in closed conference.18 7
Decisions of the Court taken in plenary session or by the panels fall
into three categories: (1) a decision on the merits of the case is referred
to as a "decree" (postanovlenie); (2) an opinion in the course of an
impeachment proceeding against the President is called a "finding" (zak-
176. New Law, supra note 115, art. 34. An exception allowing the Court to work
while an ongoing case is postponed because of inadequate preparation or need for
further study was already part of the Old Law. CompareNew Law, supra note 115, art. 60,
with Old Law, supra note 23, art. 33, 4-5. This provision, however, could not prevent
the Court from abstaining from all other activities for more than six months while con-
sidering the Communist Party case (May 25 to November 30, 1992).
177. New Law, supra note 115, art. 34.
178. Id. art. 40.
179. Id.
180. Id. art. 41.
181. Id. art. 42.
182. Id. art. 49.
183. Id. art. 53.
184. Id. art. 60.
185. Id. art. 62.
186. Id. art. 66.
187. Id. art. 70. This article has obviously been overlooked by Blankenagel, who
writes "It was astonishing to Western observers of the Russian Constitutional Court that,
under the old law, the Court voted in public. Article 72 of the law retains this proce-
dure." Blankenagel, supra note 103, at 78. Blankenagel, however, fails to acknowledge
that article 72 concerns open, as opposed to secret, balloting by the justices in closed
conference. Under the Old Law, justices could opt to vote in closed conference. Old
Law, supra note 23, art. 28, 7 (three justices must request closed conference). To my
knowledge, this was usually the case.
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liuchenie); (3) all other decisions are referred to as "rulings"
(opredeleniya).188
In reaching a decision the Court is limited to the subject-matter of the
petitioner's request and the article of the act which has been challenged.
It is not bound by the arguments advanced by the petitioner, and it is not
restricted to a literal interpretation of the Constitution. The Court may
consider current "official and other" interpretations and administrative
practices, 18 9 as well as the position of the law "within the system of legal
acts."19 0
The Bulletin of the Constitutional Court is to publish dissenting and
concurring opinions of individual justices alongside the majority deci-
sion.191 Decisions are also to be published in other official publications of
the state organs concerned.192 They become effective when announced
by the Court; unconstitutional acts become immediately invalid. If this
nullification creates a gap in legal regulation, the Constitution applies
directly.' 93 Article 80 does, however, leave the door open for the Court to
set a later date for its decision to take effect.' 9 4
C. Special Procedures
In Part III, Chapters IX to XV (articles 84-109), the New Law sets out spe-
cial procedures for seven special types of cases: normative acts of organs
of state power and treaties between them (ch. IX); international treaties
that have not yet entered into force (ch. X); disputes about competence
(ch. XI); citizens' complaints (ch. XI); referrals by courts (ch. XIII);
interpretation of the Constitution (ch. XIV); and impeachment of the
President of the Russian Federation (ch. XV). With respect to each of
these categories, the Law addresses four issues: standing, admissibility of
the request, limits of examination, and final ruling.19 5
Thus, for instance, the constitutionality of normative acts of organs of
state power or treaties between them may be examined at the request of a
number of high state organs: the President, one-fifth of the members of
the Council of the Federation or the Duma, the Government of the Rus-
sian Federation, the Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of Arbitration,
and the organs of legislative or executive power of the members of the
188. New Law, supra note 115, art. 71.
189. Id. art. 74.
190. Id.
191. Id. art. 76 (providing for publication in the Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiis-
hoi Federatsit).
192. Id. art. 78.
193. Id. art. 79.
194. Id. art. 80. The Austrian Constitutional Court may set a time limit of up to 18
months in the case of statutes, and 12 months in the case of substatutory regulations. B-
VG, supra note 149, arts. 139(5) and 140(5) (as revised). This approach seems to be
more satisfactory than the German options of considering a law "unconstitutional and
void," or "unconstitutional but not void," or "barely constitutional." See KlAus
SCHLAICH, DAs BUNDESVERFANINGSGERICHT 219-60 (3d ed. 1994).
195. New Law, supra note 115, ch. IX-XV.
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Russian Federation. 196 The same state organs may ask the Constitutional
Court to determine the constitutionality of an international treaty that has
not yet entered into force but is subject to ratification by the State Duma
or the approval of another federal organ of state power.19 7 The review of
constitutionality may be "abstract," i.e., the challenge may be brought with-
out a specific case or controversy having arisen. This is typical of the Aus-
trian (and West European) model of constitutional review.' 9 8
A dispute about competence may be brought to the Court only if a
written complaint of the petitioner to his opponent has remained unsatis-
fied for more than one month' 9 9 or if prior conciliation procedures have
failed.2 00
Citizens or their organizations may lodge complaints concerning the
violation of their constitutional rights and freedoms.20 1 If the Constitu-
tional Court accepts the complaint for examination, it has to notify the
state organ concerned, but this notification does not automatically sus-
pend pending proceedings. 20 2 If the Court considers the contested act or
provision unconstitutional, the organs concerned are to decide the pend-
ing case accordingly. 20 3
At first sight, these provisions appear to broaden considerably access
to the Court, in so far as they do not require citizens to exhaust all pos-
sibilities of appeal or even await a decision of the trial courL204 Whereas
the previous law granted the Constitutional Court discretion to reject a
petition if it considered a review "inadvisable,"20 5 the New Law appears to
allow an appeal as of right with no discretion of the Court and no screen-
196. Id. art. 84.
197. Id. art. 88.
198. See Alexander von Branneck, Constitutional Review and Legislation in Western
Democracies, in CONSTrruTnONAL REVEw AND LEGISLATION 219, 228 (Christine Landfried
ed., 1988).
199. New Law, supra note 115, art. 93, 1 5-6.
200. The New Constitution allows for such provisions:
The President of the RF may use conciliation procedures to resolve disagree-
ments between organs of state power of the RF and organs of state power of
subjects of the RF, and also between organs of state power of subjects of the RF.
In the event of failure to reach an agreed solution he may refer the resolution
of the dispute for examination by the appropriate court.
New Const., supra note 12, art. 85(1).
201. Id. art. 97. These complaints are in response to a law that has been applied or is
due to be applied by a court or other state organ to a specific case.
202. New Law, supra note 115, art. 98. However, the organ concerned may itself
decide to suspend proceedings. Id.
203. Id. art. 100. According to the Court's Explanatory Remarks accompanying its
Draft Law, this approach was designed in order to prevent the Constitutional Court
from interfering with the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Draft Law, supra note 128,
at 8.
204. Article 66 of the Old Law not only required the petitioner to have received a
final ruling that had entered into legal force, but also to demonstrate a practice of
applying the unconstitutional law-at least potentially-beyond the case in point. Old
Law, supra note 23, art. 66.
205. Id. art. 69, 1 14.
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ing standards whatsoever.20 6 A careful reading of the Constitution, how-
ever, shows that this chapter is not self-executing. It requires enabling
legislation to become effective. At least that is how Russian legal scholars
understand the qualifying clause in Article 125 of the New Constitution
which reads: "The Constitutional Court... shall review the constitutional-
ity... in accordance with procedures established by federal law."20 7 This federal
law has not been passed as of this writing.
When a court determines that a law to be applied to a case before it is
unconstitutional, it shall suspend proceedings and submit the question to
the Constitutional Court 08 This provision reflects the German model of
richteroorlage (judicial referral),209 and this process may serve as an impor-
tant teaching device for raising the constitution-consciousness of the ordi-
nary courts. Because this new access to the Court 10 also depends upon
enabling legislation, it is as yet unclear whether it will apply to all courts
(as in Germany),211 only to courts of appeal (Austria),212 or be restricted
to courts of last resort (Austria prior to 1975).213
Authoritative interpretations of the Constitution by the Court may be
requested by the President, by either house of Parliament, by the Govern-
ment of the Russian Federation, or by legislative organs of members of the
Federation. 214 The interpretations are binding on everyone.2 15
Concerning the problem of impeachment by a hostile parliament, a
situation which PresidentYeltsin confronted more than once, Article 93 of
the New Constitution curtails the powers of both the legislature and the
Constitutional Court. The State Duma may, with a two-thirds majority of
its total membership, indict the President for treason or other serious
crimes. The Supreme Court must then determine whether any such crime
has indeed been committed. The Constitutional Court is restricted to issu-
ing a finding that the proper constitutional procedure has been
observed.2 16 The Council of the Federation may then remove the Presi-
dent from office, provided that two-thirds of its total membership agree to
do so within three months from the date the charge was brought by the
206. New Law, supra note 115, ch. XfI.
207. New Const., supra note 12, art. 125(4) (emphasis added).
208. New Law, supra note 115, art. 101. Regular court proceedings shall be resumed
after the decision of the Constitutional Court. Id. art. 103.
209. GG, supra note 32, art. 100(1).
210. The final wording of article 125 in the New Constitution suggests that this
instrument was agreed upon by the working group revising the Draft Constitution
between July 12 and November 10, 1993.
211. GG, supra note 32, art. 100(1).
212. B-VG, supra note 149, art. 140(1).
213. Id. art. 140(1) (before revision).
214. New Law, supra note 115, art. 105.
215. Id. art. 106.
216. Id. arts. 107-11. The Old Law had authorized the Constitutional Court to issue a
finding on the substance of the charge; the Supreme Court was not involved in the
procedure. Impeachment could be brought for any violation of the Constitution. Old
Law, supra note 23, art. 74, 1. The Constitutional Court could even take the initiative
in sending a finding to Parliament. Id. 1 2.
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IV. Forming the "New" Constitutional Court
In Part Five (Transitional Provisions), the New Law somewhat optimisti-
cally (one might also say naively) declares "[t]he full membership of the
Russian Federation Constitutional Court must be formed no later than
thirty days after the entry into force of this federal constitutional law."
The New Law went into effect on July 23, 1994.
On October 6, 1994, President Yeltsin submitted to the Council of the
Federation a list of six candidates for appointment to the Constitutional
Court.21 8 On October 24, voting by secret ballot, the Council elected only
three justices from Yeltsin's list: Professor Olga S. Khokhryakova (fifty-five
years old and an expert in labor law at the Institute of Legislation and
Comparative Legal Studies associated with the Government of the Russian
Federation), Professor Vladimir A. Tumanov (sixty-eight years old, a lead-
ing specialist in legal theory as well as comparative and constitutional law
at the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and
also a deputy to the Duma from Sergei Shakhrai's Party of Regional Unity
and Accord), and Vladimir G. Yaroslavtsev (forty-two years old, and a
judge in the Leningrad City Court). The three other candidates failed to
win the required ninety votes: Mikhail Mityukov, First Vice-Chairman of
the Duma; Professor Valerii Savitsky, a prominent specialist in criminal
procedure; and Associate Professor Mikhail Krasnov, a consultant to Yurii
Baturin, President Yeltsin's national security adviser.2 1 9
On November 15, 1994, the Council of the Federation voted on a list
of five candidates for the remaining three openings on the Court.220 In
the first round of voting, the Council of the Federation eliminated Raif
Biktagirov, legal correspondent for the newspaper Izvestiia Tatarstana, and
Yurii Kalmykov, Minister ofJustice and a prominent specialist in constitu-
tional law. In the final round, professors Valerii Savitskii and Mikhail Kras-
nov, unsuccessful candidates on October 24 but renominated by the
President, again failed to receive the required majority. Only one of the
five candidates, Yurii M. Danilov (forty-two years old, former Chairman of
the Voronezh Oblast Court, later Deputy Minister of Justice, and at the
time of his nomination Deputy Chairman of the State Committee on
217. New Const., supra note 12, art. 93(2)-(3).
218. He drew his choices from a list of almost 50 names submitted by various institu-
tions and organizations, among them the All-Russian Congress ofJudges, the Ministry
ofJustice, and caucuses of members of Parliament. The President's personnel policy
council screened each candidate. See Yurii Feofanov, Who Wdl Staff the Constitutional
Court.?, IzvEsas, Oct. 11, 1994, at 2.
219. The election results were published in SZ RF, Issue No. 27, Item Nos. 2829
(Tumanov), 2830 (Khokhryakova), 2831 (Yaroslavtsev), and 2828 (rejections) (1994).
Sergei Parkhomenko, New Recruits in the Constitutional Court: Half the Draftees Fail to Pass
Muster, SEGODNIA, Oct. 25, 1994, at 1, translated in 46 CuRtNT DIG. OF THE POST-SoVIET
PREss No. 43, at 15 (1994).
220. Oleg Velichko, Yeltsin Offers Five Candidates to Constitutional Court, TASS, Nov. 3,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, TASS File.
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Antimonopoly Policy), passed scrutiny and brought the membership of
the Court to seventeen.2 21
On December 1, 1994, President Yeltsin nominated two more candi-
dates to fill the remaining vacancies on the Court. On December 6, the
Council of the Federation elected Vladimir Strekozov (fifty-four years old,
Doctor of Law, Deputy Head of the Military Academy of Economics,
Finance and Law, and a major general) with a comfortable majority of 100
votes. 222 President Yeltsin's other candidate, Sergei Vitsin (Doctor of Law,
Department Head at the Moscow Higher Police Academy, and also a
major general), received only seventy-eight votes and thus was not
elected.2 23
For the last remaining vacancy on the Court, President Yeltsin nomi-
nated Robert Tsivilev, who was a legal aide to his Chief of Staff Sergei
Filatov. On December 16, 1994, the Council of the Federation cast eighty-
six votes (of the required ninety) in favor and forty-five against him, falling
short of appointment by merely four votes.2 2 4
Assuming he had mustered the necessary votes, President Yeltsin
again presented Robert Tsivilev to the Council of the Federation on Janu-
ary 13, 1995. On January 17, Tsivilev was defeated for the second time,
garnering only sixty-one votes. 225 One reason for this defeat may have
been President Yeltsin's refusal to nominate Issa Kostoev, 226 chairman of
the Federation Council Committee for Constitutional Legislation, Judicial
and Legal Matters, and a popular choice among Council Members.
The unfortunate effect of this political maneuvering between the
President and the Council of the Federation was that more than one year
after the adoption of the new Constitution the Constitutional Court was
still inoperative. This delay was due to the Transitional Provisions of the
New Constitutional Law which required the election of the Chairman and
other officers of the Court as well as the formation of the two chambers to
take place "following the formation of [the Court's] full membership." 227
221. SZ RF, Issue No. 31, Item No. 3204 (1994). Sergei Parkhomenko, Federation
Council Rejects New Batch of Candidates for Membership in Constitutional Court, SEGODNIA,
Nov. 16, 1994, at 2, translated in 46 CuRRENT DIG. OF THE PosT-Sov=r Parss No. 46, at 21
(1994).
222. SZ RF, Issue No. 33, Item No. 3410 (1994). IZvSriA, Dec. 8, 1994, at 1, trans-
lated in 46 CURRENT DIG. OF THE Posr-Sovizr Parss No. 49, at 19 (1995).
223. SZ RF, Issue No. 33, Item No. 3411 (1994).
224. SZ RF, Issue No. 35, Item No. 3659 (1994). Only One Vacancy on Constitutional
Court, Federation Council Rejects Yeltsin Nominee as Judge of Constitutional Court, Interfax
News Agency, Dec. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB File.
225. SZ RF, Issue No. 4, Item No. 268 (1995). Federation CouncilRejects Yeltsin's Nomi-
nee for Constitutional Court Vacancy, Interfax News Agency, Jan. 20, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB File.
226. Id. See also Filatov Criticizes Federation Counci4 RIA News Agency, Jan. 19, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB File.
227. New Law, supra note 115, part V, 3. "The Russian Federation Constitutional
Court, following the formation of its full membership, elects a chairman, deputy-chair-
man, and justice-secretary, and forms the membership of the panels of the Russian
Federation Constitutional Court." Id. According to a statement by Acting Chairman
Nikolai Vitruk on December 30, 1994, the Court would not work until the last vacancy
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Meanwhile, Court members grew restive because so many important issues
awaited resolution. On December 30, 1994, Acting Court Chairman Niko-
lai Vitruk openly aired his disappointment, pointing out more than sixty
open cases on which the Court would have to act.22 8 Justice Ernest
Ametistov even accused the Council of the Federation of "sabotage" and
suggested that the Court resume its work without waiting for the last mem-
ber to be elected.229
On February 2, 1995, President Yeltsin presented to the Council two
law professors as candidates for the last vacant seat on the Constitutional
Court: Anatoli Vengerov, a prominent specialist in legal theory and con-
stitutional law, and Marat Baglai, an expert in constitutional and labor
law.230 On February 7, the Council elected Marat Baglai (sixty-four years
old, and First Pro-Rector of the Academy of Labor and Social Relations) by
a vote of 101 to thirty.23 '
On February 13, 1995, the Constitutional Court elected Professor
Vladimir Tumanov as Chairman by a vote of eleven to eight,232 and Profes-
sor Tamara Morshchakova as Vice-Chairman, while reelecting Yurii
Rudkin as Secretary of the Court.233 On February 15, the Court formed
two panels of nine and ten justices, respectively. 2m After more than six-
teen months of suspension, there was again a functional Constitutional
Court ready to assume an active role in the Russian legal and political
system.
V. Evaluation of the New Legislation on the Constitutional Court
An analysis of the provisions of the new Constitution and the new Consti-
tutional Law on the Constitutional Court yields a number of surprising
observations. First, the Constitutional Court survived its serious political
confrontation with the President virtually unscathed. Second, the New
Law does not profoundly reflect the lessons that should have been learned
from flaws in the previous law and from the Court's own mistakes in apply-
ing that law. Third, the Court and other constitutional law specialists were
was filled because to do so would violate the Law on the Constitutional Court. Constitu-
tional Court Acting Chairman on Prospects for 1995, Interfax News Agency, Jan. 3, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB File.
228. See Constitutional Court Acting Chairman on Prospects for 1995, supra note 227.
Vitruk also complained about the Finance Ministry illegally slashing the Court's 1995
budget from 16 to 12 billion rubles. Id.
229. Yelena Tregubova, Constitutional Court Tries to Start Work One Man Short,
SEGODNIA, Jan. 25, 1995, at 2.
230. Lyudmilla Yermakova, Yeltsin Recommends Two Judges to Fill Vacancy, ITAR-TASS,
Feb. 2, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, TASS File.
231. SZ RF, Issue No. 7, Item No. 498 (1995). Russian Constitutional Court Formed
Xinhua News Agency, Feb. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File.
232. IzvnsrA, Feb. 14, 1995, at 1.
233. Igor Belsky, Rudkin Elected Secretary of Constitutional Court, TASS, Feb. 14, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, TASS File.
234. Constitutional Court Forms Two Houses, Interfax News Agency, Feb. 17, 1995, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB File.
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not able to make better use of time-tested foreign models in drafting the
New Law.
A. Continuity of Personnel and Functions
After Valerii Zorkin's reluctant resignation as Chairman on October 6,
1993, the Court, under Acting Chairman Nikolai Vitruk, kept a low profile
and apparently came to terms with the President in such a way as to
emerge relatively unharmed in the revised (November 10, 1993) Draft of
the Constitution.23 5 Threats and fears that the Court might be dissolved,
and that some of its major functions would be abolished or transferred
proved to be unfounded.
All thirteen justices from the Old Court retained their "life tenure"
(until age sixty-five) and benefits.2 3 6 These thirteen had been nominated
by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet (Ruslan Khasbulatov) and
appointed by secret election in the Congress of People's Deputies on
October 29, 1991.237 At that time, six of the justices were members of
Parliament. The nominations were largely part of a package deal adopted
by all parliamentary caucuses, including the Communists. The agreement
was reached before the unsuccessful August 1991 coup against Gorbachev
and was not affected by the latter. With one exception (Tamara
Morshchakova), all thirteen justices had been members of the CPSU.
Given the fact that nine of these justices consistently opposed Presi-
dent Yeltsin in the past, the constitutional provision for the election of six
additional justices by the Council of the Federation can hardly be consid-
ered a court-packing bill. It does not automatically assure the President of
a solid majority on the Court, although the right of nomination would
appear to enable him to alter the balance in his favor. Surprisingly, in the
course of constitutional reform the President did not demand the right to
nominate the Chairman and Deputy-Chairman of the Court.23 8 The
absence of this nomination right seems to further reduce the influence of
the President and enhance the independence of the Court.
The professional backgrounds and qualifications of the new appoin-
tees show no dramatic departure from past appointments. Seven of the
original thirteen justices-the Parliament was incapable of filling the
remaining two openings-possess the highest academic qualification in
law (the doctor iuridicheskikh nauk degree). One of the justices is female
(Morshchakova) and two justices are members of ethnic minorities (Gad-
shiev from Dagestan and Ebseev from Saratov).239
Of the six new appointees, four possess the highest academic qualifi-
cation (the doctorate of law), and two are former judges. Some observers
235. New Const., supra note 12, art. 125.
236. New Const., supra note 12, part II, item 5.
237. Hausmaninger II, supra note 21, at 332.
238. In Austria, they are nominated by the government and appointed by the Fed-
eral President; in Germany they are elected by parliament. B-VG, supra note 149, art.
147(2); German Law, supra note 32, art. 5.
239. VESmNK, supra note 24, at 13 (Morshehakova), 10 (Gadshiev), and 17 (Ebseev).
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may consider these appointments a correction of a weakness of the old
Court.240 One of the six new appointees is a woman and none represent
an ethnic minority, while at least two (the two formerjudges) come from
cities other than Moscow. Their average age is fifty-four, very close to that
of the original justices. However, Chairman Tumanov will reach age sev-
enty in less than two years, at which time he must leave the Court. An
appointment of such limited duration would never happen in Germany or
Austria, but the Russian situation is unusual, and Professor Tumanov may
yet play a valuable role in directing the new Court during his brief tenure.
Perhaps President Yeltsin planned to put a trusted person on the Court
other than Tumanov, who could have been elected Chairman, but the
Council of the Federation thwarted his ambition. It is also possible that
several candidates refused to enter the contest unless they were assured of
the Chairmanship. Whereas the election of Valerii Zorkin was predicted
by many political insiders in 1991,241 the current situation was less clear.
Russian Constitutional Court justices are products of the Communist
nomenklatura system. They would not have reached their positions without
the political loyalty and adaptability required by that system. Some of
them may have retained more conservative political beliefs, while others
may have developed progressive views. As long as it appeared possible, or
even likely, that the Parliament would emerge victorious from its struggle
with the President, the conservatives on the Court could well afford to
challenge the President in the name of "constitutional legality." Once the
President had consolidated his power, political opposition became self-
destructive. In a system that continues to be based on quasi-feudal alli-
ances and opportunism, it will not be surprising to find a more coopera-
tive attitude on the part of the President's former opponents on the Court
as long as the President appears to have firm control of the vast powers
allocated to his office under the new Constitution. In light of his first
appointments, President Yeltsin seemed reasonably certain that the future
Court would respond to his political needs. However, the subsequent bru-
tal and incredibly clumsy handling of the Chechnya situation has raised
grave doubts about the course of Russian politics in the minds of many
Russians, including President Yeltsin's most loyal supporters. 242 A polit-
ical crisis of enormous magnitude may again engulf all Russian institu-
tions, including the Constitutional Court. From this perspective, much
will depend on the signals which the Court sends in its first decisions.
240. SeeBlankenagel, supra note 103, at 76. It may be true in a very limited sense that
former judges are more accustomed than law professors to the procedural fetters
imposed on the work of the Court. However, academic lawyers are more likely to bring
about a much-needed change in legal perspective than are career judges reared in the
Soviet tradition. Unfortunately, nobody thought of appointing a successful defense
attorney to the Court.
241. This was the impression I received in Moscow in the summer of 1991. But see
Zorkin Aspired to the Presidency, IzvEsrnA, Nov. 20, 1993, at 4, translated in 45 CURRENT
Di. OF THE PosT-SoviET PREss No. 47, at 10 (1993) (Acting Chairman Vitruk stated that
the outcome of the election was neither predetermined nor certain).
242. See Chechen War Meets Mounting Opposition in Russia, 46 CURRENT Di. OF THE
Pos-SovIE-r PREss No. 52, at 9-12 (1995).
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B. Learning from the Past
The New Law unquestionably intends to correct technical shortcomings of
the Old Law and to redefine and strengthen the Court's role in an emerg-
ing legal system characterized by separation of powers and the rule of law.
It makes several promising attempts to reinforce the independence of the
justices and to depoliticize the activities of the Court. The most obvious
step in the direction of depoliticization is the elimination of the Court's
right to take the initiative in impeachment proceedings. 243 A similar
depoliticization will result from the Court's new standing requirements for
presenting the Court with a constitutional question. Previously, the Court
granted standing to any deputy. The New Law, however, requires at least
one-fifth of the total membership of either house of Parliament to present
a constitutional question.244 It also abolishes standing for social associa-
tions in matters of abstract review. 245 Despite these restrictions, the stand-
ing requirements are still extremely vague and undifferentiated; they
provide little safeguard against the Court's involuntary involvement in
political conflicts. 246
The Old Law assigned no fewer than five nonjudicial functions to the
Court: the finding (zakliuchenie) ,247 the representation (predstavlenie) ,248
the participation in sessions of other state organs,249 the legislative initia-
tive, 250 and the message (poslanie) .251 Some of these were clearly rem-
nants of the Communist past and were eliminated in the New Law for
good reason. Justices of the Constitutional Court certainly should not par-
ticipate actively in sessions of other government bodies. There is no need
for the Court to point out violations of the law to other state organs
through separate representations, 252 and there is no justification for a
requirement that the Court report annually to the legislature. 253 The
243. Although the Court generally did not have the right to issue findings on its own
initiative, it did have this right when determining the constitutionality of actions and
decisions by the President and other high state officials which could justify the initiation
of impeachment proceedings. Old Law, supra note 23, art. 32, 2. While it seems
appropriate to-eliminate this blatantly political authority, it is hard to understand why
the New Law also abolished a more sensible provision of the Old Law which allowed the
Court to go ex-officio beyond the submitted request in order to examine a constitu-
tional question. Id. art 32, 3. This principle of ex-officio review, present in certain
European models of constitutional adjudication, is rejected in article 74 of the New
Law: "The ... Court adopts decrees and produces conclusions solely on the subject
indicated in the appeal and only in respect of the section of the act or the competence
of the organ whose constitutionality is questioned in the appeal." New Law, supra note
115, art. 74.
244. New Law, supra note 115, arts. 84 and 88.
245. Id.
246. Blankenagel, supra note 103, at 76-77.
247. Old Law, supra note 23, art. 74.
248. Id. art. 55.
249. Id. art. 26.
250. Id. art. 9.
251. Id. art. 54.
252. Admonitions may, of course, be contained in regular opinions of the Court.
253. The Court should, however, take steps to ensure that other state organs and the
public are periodically informed of its activities and observations. See Constitutional
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nonjudicial functions remaining in the New Law are the legislative initia-
tive and the finding. The former was redefined,254 but the need for this
function is questionable. The right to issue findings is now confined to
technical aspects of the impeachment process,255 and there is also little
justification for retaining this function.
Unfortunately, the Russian legal and political establishment retained
a major obstacle to efficient constitutional review: the obligatory public
hearing, which involves elaborate and immensely time-consuming adver-
sarial fact finding and pleading procedures,25 6 from which the Law con-
tains no escape clause. No potential argument turning on "glasnost' or
"legitimacy" justifies the incredible waste of time and energy which these
procedures require, and the resulting inability to deal swiftly and effec-
tively with the many serious issues confronting the Court. The inexplica-
ble retention of the provision that prohibits the Court from treating other,
potentially urgent, cases before resolving pending cases aggravates this
situation.2 57
C. Learning from Foreign Experience
During the past four years, the Court and supporters of a more efficient
constitutional review process in Russia have had ample time and opportu-
nity to study successful models of constitutional adjudication-European
and American-in numerous meetings with foreign colleagues, scholars,
and advisers. The result of this intellectual exposure has been modest, at
best.
Arguably, the introduction of twelve-year terms and two panels, as in
Germany, may enhance quality and speed in the Court's work. However,
the reservation of important functions to a nineteen-member plenum-
including the adoption and assignment of every individual case for exami-
nation-shows that profound political distrust overwhelms considerations
of professional efficiency. Despite this manifest distrust, reformers could
have adopted safeguards to secure the jurisdiction of the full court while
also utilizing the positive experiences of the countries (e.g., Germany and
Austria) with smaller screening panels258 and screening standards. 259 A
Court Report on the State of Constitutionality in Russia, RossusIsA GAZETA, Mar. 11, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB File.
254. New Law, supra note 115, art. 3, 6 ("[takes legislative initiatives on questions
within its own purview...
255. Id. arts. 107-10.
256. See Blankenagel, supra note 103, at 77-78 (critizing "[t] his very Russian approach
257. Sergei Pashin, who had drafted the previous law while serving on the staff of the
Supreme Soviet and now heads the Department of Court Reform in the President's
State Legal Administration (GPU), has indirectly criticized the delay this provision may
impose. One wonders why Pashin, who actively participated in the drafting process, was
unable to assist in the development of a more efficient Court. See Sergei Pashin, A
Second Edition of the Constitutional Court, E. EUR. CONSr. REV., Fall 1994, at 82, 83.
258. Smaller screening panels will be necessary for the adjudication of citizens' civil
rights complaints if and when this dormant procedure becomes operative under future
enabling legislation. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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positive development may be seen in the authorization of the Court to
extend the life of legislative acts judged unconstitutional so as to avoid
regulatory vacuums (as is the case in Austria) .26o In addition, an especially
noteworthy feature of the new Russian legislation is to obligate judges in
the ordinary court system to certify constitutional questions to the Consti-
tutional Court.2 61 This judicial referral is an important part of the Ger-
man 262 and Austrian2 63 systems of constitutional adjudication, and raises
the constitution-consciousness of the ordinaryjudiciary.2 64 Unfortunately,
the same provision in the Constitution that declares the right to bring a
citizen's complaint to the Constitutional Court as non-self-executing also
applies to judicial referral.2 65 It will be practically impossible to imple-
ment this process without concurrent structural and procedural reform,
which would profoundly affect the work of the Court. Such change would
include the development of screening panels with clear standards and
expedited procedures designed to avoid unacceptable delays.
A negative development is that the Court no longer has the right to
examine the constitutionality of political parties. It is with good reason
that the German Constitution assigns this politically sensitive task to the
Constitutional Court rather than the regular court system.266 The same
observation applies to electoral disputes.
Conclusion
I have attempted a first-and necessarily selective-evaluation of the tech-
nical aspects of the new Russian Constitutional Court such as structure,
functions, and procedures. The real test will be the quality of opinions
rendered by the Court and the acceptance and enforcement of these opin-
ions by the other branches of government, particularly the President and
his government.2 67 The Constitutional Court has a new, although this
time more limited, opportunity to promote the establishment of the rule
259. The Draft Law provided that the Court could refuse to examine a complaint
that was "clearly unfounded." The New Law does not contain this clause. Draft Law,
supra note 128, art. 96.
260. This period must not exceed six months or one year for unconstitutional ordi-
nances (depending on the character of the ordinance), 18 months for unconstitutional
statutes, and one or two years for unconstitutional treaties, depending upon the charac-
ter of the treaty. B-VG, supra note 149, arts. 139(5), 140(5), and 140a(1).
261. This provision was not contained in the July Draft of the New Constitution.
262. GG, supra note 32, art. 100(1).
263. B-VG, supra note 149, art. 139(1).
264. But see Pashin, supra note 257, at 83 ("[This procedure] impedes the develop-
ment of their understanding of the Constitution and, in the long run, will prevent the
direct application of the Constitution in ordinary cases."). Experience in Western
Europe has demonstrated that the opposite is true.
265. New Const., supra note 12, art. 125(4). See supra notes 120 and 174.
266. GG, supra note 32, art. 21, 2.
267. I fail to appreciate Blankenagel's view of "the really vital question":
After the storming of Parliament and its own suspension, the Court has never
given any sign that it can stand against Yeltsin's free and autocratic disposition
over the future of the Court. To an outside observer, the law looks like a deal
that could be formulated as "no bad feelings or revenge for the past and feel
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of law.26 8 To achieve this end, patient persuasion may be more helpful
than overt confrontation. The Court must refrain from political involve-
ment, and individual justices must avoid public posturing if the Court
hopes to affect and protect an emerging Russian legal culture. Since its
suspension on October 7, 1993, the Constitutional Court has had ample
time to ponder past mistakes and reflect on a future course of action. It
may have concluded that it should both signal and practice judicial
restraint as its guiding principle until by solid legal work it will have
earned that level of respect and legitimacy which will enable it to move
forward to the sort of legal activism exhibited by other constitutional
courts in other political systems. The Russian Court has yet to learn the
skills and become aware of the responsibilities of a judicial activism prac-
ticed in the public interest, as well as the art of interacting with other
governmental organs in a functioning democratic society. Given the level
of political culture in Russian legislative and executive bodies, one may
assume that these bodies will have to undergo even more profound learn-
ing processes. While Russia's road to a flourishing democratic society
under the rule of law will be long and arduous, there is clearly no
alternative.
free to regulate our future." But, in compromising in this way, the Court and
the justices may have lost their identity, pride and dignity.
Blankenagel, supra note 103, at 79.
268. I do not share Pashin's gloomy vision of two equally unproductive developmen-
tal alternatives:
It is unlikely that under present circumstances constitutional control in Russia
will prove very effective. On the one hand, since it is not legally responsible for
its decisions, the Constitutional Court may attempt a power play to repair its
damaged reputation. On the other, a meek Court, preoccupied with self-pres-
ervation and obediently approving unlawful but "reasonable" acts, will pose an
equal danger to Russia today.
Pashin, supra note 257, at 85.
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